GERMANY

IN THE

POST-WAR WORLD

ERICH KOCH-WESER

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Germany in the post-war world



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Erich Kirk - Weser

Germany in the Post-War World

BY

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of the Interior, and Minister of Justice

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

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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To
the memory
of
GUSTAV STRESEMANN

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INTRODUCTION

This volume presents a lucid, faithful, and altogether admirable sketch of Germany's foreign relations during the post-War period from 1919 to 1929. The author is the Honorable Erich Koch-Weser, leader of the Democratic party in the German Reichstag. But there is no party politics in Koch-Weser's book. He sets forth facts and makes occasional reflections and inferences, but it is all done in the objective spirit of an historian who is engaged in the free and impartial pursuit of truth.

The book could not have been written had not the author been a political leader who has dealt for many years with the actualities of politics, national and international, both in the Reichstag and before the forum of public opinion. On the other hand the quality and the tone of this work reveal a spirit which has been wont to expatiate serenely in fields of thought and feeling that lie beyond the range of the ordinary party politician and even of the ordinary party leader.

Koch-Weser is a remarkable man, who has led a varied and interesting life. His father was professor in a gymnasium. He himself was born in Bremerhaven in 1875. He studied in the universities of Lausanne, Bonn, Munich

and Berlin—his specialty being law and political science. He early devoted himself to city administration in the office of Mayor.

This office in Germany is independent of politics and free from restrictions in respect to the place of birth or residence of candidates. A German Mayor holds office for a long term and is generally reappointed and retained until he resigns or retires. In other words the mayoralty is a career. And with its administrative duties is usually combined *ex-officio* membership in the State legislature.

Koch-Weser was Mayor, in succession, of Delmenhorst, Bremerhaven, and Kassel. He held the last post throughout the trying period of the War and he had heavy legislative and national as well as administrative and local duties. His standing among the mayors of the country is indicated by his election to the presidency of the German and Prussian Cities Convention in Berlin. He was a member of the National Convention at Weimar, which framed the Constitution of the German Republic. He entered the Cabinet for the first time in 1919 as Minister of the Interior and again nine years later as Minister of Justice. In the earlier Cabinet he was also Vice-Chancellor.

A versatile and able administrator, a progressive yet cautious legislator, Koch-Weser is also a careful investigator of social and eco-

nomic conditions. Equally removed from conservatism on the one hand and from socialism on the other, he is a natural democrat and humanitarian. While he has a big heart, he has also a hard head.

The champion of progressive democracy in domestic affairs, he has zealously espoused the cause of international understanding and the pacification of Europe. He is a warm supporter of the League of Nations, which he last year attended as a member of the German delegation.

His knowledge of foreign nations has been enlarged and illuminated by foreign travel. He has not only visited France, England, and other European countries, but latterly also the Near East and last winter North Africa. In 1926 he traveled across the American Continent from Atlantic to Pacific, taking in the principal points of interest in both Canada and the United States; and he returned to New York in November in time to join (as an invited guest) in the democratic celebration of Mr. Smith's re-election as Governor of the State of New York. Since his trip to America, he has made a more leisurely and also an extensive journey to Russia; and the volume recording his observations and reflections—*Russland von heute*—has been received with much approbation by the reading public of Germany.

It will be seen that Koch-Weser, lawyer, politician and leader of the Democratic party in the Reichstag, is also an extensive traveler, a shrewd observer and investigator, and a serious and discriminating political writer. His style is much praised for its lucidity—a quality doubtless strengthened, if not actually moulded, by his experience as a speaker and debater. His sentences are short, crisp, and crystal-like in their clearness, and they are often informed with the dignity of weighty aphorisms. They are the utterances of a practical politician with the mind and character of a statesman.

Koch-Weser has associated with statesmen not only at home but also abroad. In his travels he has not indeed neglected those inanimate objects of interest which appeal to all cultivated minds. But his primary interest has been in *persons;* and everywhere he has gone he has made the acquaintance of scholars and business men, of laborers and artists, and not least of newspaper writers and political leaders and statesmen.

All this has fostered in him the international mind. It has stimulated and strengthened his devotion to European pacification, to good will among the nations, and to a reasonable pacifism —not passive, but energetic—as a modern substitute for war. On the other hand, his personal acquaintance with leading statesmen of

the world and the direct knowledge he has gained of their views and policies could not fail to have illuminated and tempered his own reflections and aims.

Germany's foreign policy since the War may be briefly characterized as a development from forcible dictation at Versailles to voluntary agreement at Locarno. It is characteristic of the straightforward honesty of Koch-Weser that he makes the confession in this volume, that, while he opposed with all his energy the signing of the Versailles Treaty and while his party withdrew from the Government on that issue, he is now doubtful whether he and they were right. For, contrary to their expectation at that time, Germany has not only survived, but prospered. And if Germany had refused to sign the Versailles Treaty, she would, he now believes, have suffered a new attack at the hands of her enemies, which, in her then condition of hunger, weakness disunity, disappointment and embitterment, she could not have met without falling to pieces.

The Ruhr invasion also demonstrated that even passive resistance to France was impossible for Germany. That invasion was the last flare-up of the fires of Force, and it proved disastrous to France as well as to Germany. Both nations discovered that their real welfare de-

manded a mutual understanding and accommodation.

This book contains a vivid picture of Germany's relations not only to France but also to the rest of the world since 1919. There is nothing heroic about the policy pursued by Germany, says the author, for it was dictated by necessity. He might, however, have added that that policy has been in harmony with the best international ideals of our time.

For the rest the reader must be referred to the book itself. He will find in it not only a clear and trustworthy account, in condensed and graphic form, of German foreign relations during the last decade but also an indication of future problems which lie along the same line of development. If, as Koch-Weser asserts, there is nothing heroic in the policy pursued by Germany, it has at any rate the merit of being realistic, and it contains the hope of a better future through a fuller and more devoted co-operation of all the nations concerned.

The book is dedicated to the memory of Gustav Stresemann. No dedication could have been more appropriate. For the name of Stresemann will be forever associated with the foreign policy pursued by Germany from August, 1923, when he took over the office of Foreign Minister, until October, 1929, when, worn and exhausted by incessant labors and endless cares, he fell,

in full sight of the promised land, a glorious martyr to his country's cause.



May 22, 1930.
The Old Parsonage,
Bedford Hills,
Westchester County,
New York.

PART ONE

PROBING THE PAST

CHAPTER I

PRESENT-DAY POWERS THAT BE

America Comes into Her Own

America, only a few decades ago an asylum for the politically and economically homeless, is today the abode of almost the elect only. Eugenic requirements are now being imposed upon immigrants. The United States not only controls nearly one-third of all the raw materials in the world, but also possesses an untold hoard of gold. Contemporary America undoubtedly enjoys a leading political position, even in European affairs. On the other hand, since the War, she has detached herself economically more and more from Europe by endeavoring to open up new markets for herself in South America and across the Pacific. She is also detaching herself culturally from Europe because, economically and politically matured, she strives to develop her own culture. This becomes strikingly evident from the fact that in the United States the study of foreign languages and foreign history is becoming more and more restricted to purely academic circles.

The masses, generally speaking, concentrate on American subjects only.

One reason for this growing alienation of America from most things European is the profound spiritual disappointment the United States experienced when she came to the assistance of her unappreciative Allies during the World War. Traveling through America, the visiting foreigner is repeatedly asked: "Is America really acting the part of Uncle Shylock? Is she unyielding and cruel in collecting her just demands? Is it not a fact that America contributed liberally to the support of all those ideas for which she unsheathed her sword —for the ideas of democracy and anti-imperialism, for world peace and for justice?" America, whose entrance into the War was brought about, at least so far as the understanding of the propagandistically influenced populace was concerned, not so much by economic, but rather by idealistic motives, is actually tiring of Europe. The United States is Europe-shy. As a matter of fact, America is doubtful whether her entrance into the War really served to further her ideals.

Although the ties between Europe and America were considerably loosened under the stress of recent years, they are by no means torn asunder. Despite the fact that the majority of Americans are not attuned to European

education, the better classes still like to study Europe's old civilization. They are doing this in much the same way as the old Romans were inclined to sympathize with the older civilization of the Greeks, visiting Hellas and admiring her culture, even after Rome herself had assumed the inheritance of the imperium. Besides, to import scientific findings and technical achievements from Europe—or better yet, to exchange them with Europe—still remains an inescapable necessity for America. Furthermore, America, which before the War strained every effort to free herself from European imports, in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency, now faces the imminent necessity of exporting her goods and her gold. To this end she absolutely needs Europe.

By and large, the United States has of late grown somewhat hesitant in the expression of political interests abroad. She is wary about taking an active part in foreign politics and, if obliged to do so, she proceeds carefully. "The American Observer" by now has become an institution at European congresses.

America's entrance into the League of Nations—Wilson's own creation—seems more improbable today than ever before. The influence that Europe's political life exerts on America, and especially on elections there, must not be over-estimated. The American people,

as a whole, hardly display any interest at all in foreign politics. However, it must not be overlooked that even in the European countries, foreign politics is considered a highly specialized subject, for experts only. Even in Europe, it is assumed that foreign politics does not belong before the forum of a parliament and must decidedly have no place whatever in public meetings. Small wonder that the American, as an individual, as the citizen of a country situated invulnerably between two oceans, looks upon European affairs with scant interest. All attempts to draw America more closely into European affairs, be it for the advancement of human ideals, be it for the sake of maintaining safe and secure markets for her goods and her gold, are met by the voters of that country, without any differentiation as to a political allegiance, with a sentiment closely bordering on a disinterestedness, aroused by suspicion.

This, of course, is not so very surprising in view of the fact that America treats even her own important internal problems rather lightly. Such issues are relegated to the background for the simple reason that the contest between the two big parties is primarily one for power. It seems next to impossible that a new third party, propagating new ideas, could ever seriously contest the influence wielded by the two established parties. There are numerous problems

awaiting practical solution, but with these, it seems, American politics does not bother to any great extent.

To enumerate only a few of the problems: there is the question how to provide in future sufficient hands for menial labor in view of the drastic restriction of immigration; this is a problem which threatens to become serious in the next generation. Then, there is the question of the relation between white and colored Americans. In view of the declining birth rate of the whites, this problem is liable to grow into a grave issue, within the span of a few generations. The maintenance and raising of an established farm population is also a problem in this country where everyone has the ambition to get rich quickly. All these problems are clearly discernible in the political offing, but they are more or less ignored by American politics. It seems difficult to discover issues of real economic and political tangibility in the course of American election campaigns. The fight against alcoholism, of course, plays an important part now after the American people, more reckless than purposeful, made this question an outstanding issue. In addition, a decided contrast between the old puritanical stock and the new cosmopolitan population becomes increasingly apparent in connection with the prohibition issue.

A mere four decades ago, the United States was considered politically inferior to the great European powers. It seems almost unbelievable now that Europe, in 1898, doubted America's ability to win the war against Spain. Today, forty years later, it is not even possible to place European countries on the same plane as America. America of today is undoubtedly far superior to Europe. Should this superiority be considered just an episode, or should the European expect this superiority to last? Personally, I cannot see how and why America's political and economic position in the world should ever decline.

What makes for this superiority of America in so many different fields, as compared to Europe? Why is it that in many things, America is a hundred and fifty years ahead of Europe, despite the fact that Europe looks back upon a thousand years of cultural and economic development?

There are numerous reasons. In the first place, America's outstanding position is the result of her geographical situation. In years gone by, the question was raised, time and again, whether countries, situated along an ocean coast, or around great inland seas, are superior to continental powers. It is an established fact that many great powers developed around great bodies of water. One reason was

the simple fact that distant parts of the realm could be reached more easily by water than over bad land roads. Analagous to the Phœnician and Roman empires, which developed around the Mediterranean, the Spaniards, the Dutch and—even more successful than all the others—the English, succeeded in extending their sovereignty along the coasts of the ocean. As a matter of fact, there were countries which attained the status of great powers only on the strength of their fleets. Venice maintained her important position through many centuries of the middle ages because of this.

Today, however, it appears that naval powers are inferior to continental powers. The most deciding factor seems to be a purely military one. Modern wars require fighters in enormous numbers, and material of tremendous volume. During the last War, the combined strength of the English, the French and the Italians proved unavailing in vanquishing the Turks by naval expeditions. The fact that the American continent is so compact and situated invulnerably between two oceans renders every attempt to attack American soil impractical from the very start. For this reason, it is not necessary for America to indulge in far-reaching and expensive preparedness. Unlike European countries, always aiming at mobilizing their very last man, America is saved this ter-

rific expense. European countries have for centuries been groaning under the heavy burdens of militarism and navalism which are their very undoing. On the other hand, should she ever face a war, America would have ample time to make preparations.

The expanse of the country is still more important from an economical aspect. The very length and width of the United States make for better living conditions than the overcrowded spaces to which the European nations are confined. This advantage of America is most strikingly illustrated when considering her tremendous wealth of raw materials. America—and by this I always means the United States proper—produces today, aside from the grain which not only covers her own necessities but is exported to a great extent, not less than fifty-five per cent of all the iron ore in the world, fifty-one per cent of pig-iron, sixty-six per cent of steel, fifty-four per cent of copper, sixty-two per cent of oil, forty-three per cent of coal, fifty-two per cent of wood, forty-two per cent of phosphates, eighty per cent of sulphur, sixty-two per cent of lead, sixty-four per cent of zinc, and fifty-five per cent of cotton, compared to the entire respective productions of the whole world. On the other hand, America is inhabited by only one-fifteenth of all the people of the world, thus enjoying a tremen-

dous advantage in international economic contests. There is not one field of endeavor in which America cannot easily prove herself superior to any other nation in the world, whether it be producing food for her population, or providing work for her industries; she is favored with everything that tends to further civilization and culture, and all this logically leads to America's present-day superiority.

There have been times when America proved herself extremely wasteful in the exploitation of her natural resources. However, an end has been put to such extravagant methods, and there is no possibility that America's natural wealth will become exhausted in the near future. German industry primarily restricts itself to converting imported raw materials, in this way profiting only to the extent of the difference between the raw material and the finished product. American industry, availing itself of its own raw materials, enriches the national wealth doubly.

It is especially the tremendous expanse of the country that impresses the European traveler. The self-same thing which depresses the German, frequently serving to make him antagonistic to his competitor—the impossibility of finding sufficient elbow-room for the exploitation of his abilities—will impede the American only in the rarest cases. Germany,

with her well-trained population, does not offer enough chances for the development of her innumerable talents. On the other hand, in America, men lacking sufficient schooling are given opportunities to improve their education from the point of view that any man who makes good in practical life is entitled to perfect his theoretical knowledge. In Germany, this is not the case. There, not even those men who have successfully completed their training, are given jobs commensurate with their education.

Another of America's advantages is her geographical formation. The United States represents a tremendous square which is conducive to quick communication between the different parts of the country, unlike the more or less longitudinal peninsula which Europe represents. There are the two oceans, the one in the West, the other in the East; in the South is the Gulf of Mexico, and in the North the tremendous Great Lakes which, to a certain extent, serve the purpose of oceans. Besides, America enjoys extremely favorable climes. That America was settled so quickly was due to the fact that her climate is at least equal to the best of Europe.

It is an established fact that farmers are averse to immigrate to countries which presuppose a different method of farming from that to which they are accustomed. Up to a

very short time ago, the farmer learned to till his soil by practice only. The theoretical training of the farming population is of comparatively recent date and by no means general. All the German farmers, the Irish and the English, the French and the Slavs who emigrated to the United States, and recently to Canada also, find conditions of soil, irrigation and climate analagous to those prevailing in their homeland. In this respect, very interesting observations may be made. It is not a mere accident that German farmers, centuries ago, could be induced by the German Knights to settle in East and West Prussia. They refused to go still farther north into the Balticum for the simple reason that, up there, agricultural methods as they knew them in West Germany could no longer be employed. The extremely favorable climatic conditions of the United States account for this tremendous country being settled in such a comparatively short time.

One thing frequently overlooked in Germany is the fact that the United States extends into the sub-tropical zone. Almost the entire sea coast along the Pacific Ocean enjoys superb climate. Looking upon these enviable stretches of land, the question enters one's mind whether humanity did not make a mistake in evolving the civilization and culture of the last two thou-

sand years in the temperate zone. After all, the biggest and most flourishing empires developed in the sub-tropics: Assyria, Babylonia, and Egypt. Peoples like the Jews in Palestine developed a high spiritual culture in sub-tropical climes. Even Greek culture developed on a soil, which, though not exactly sub-tropical, shows many characteristics of sub-tropical climate. Time and again, the trend of the nations was toward the South. Thus, Alexander the Great went to India, the Romans to Byzantium, the Hohenstaufen to Sicily. The trend toward the south was always surprisingly manifest, and it still remains a question whether man in general was not much happier under a warmer sun and bluer skies.

The reason why those sub-tropical empires toppled, was always the same: irrigation did not keep step with the growth of civilization. That Los Angeles prospers is due primarily to the fact that, hardly 200 miles distant, on the heights of the mountains, an enormous watershed releases fertilizing floods, changing arid areas into a paradise. Because of this natural irrigation, it is possible to have in Los Angeles and the surrounding country, orange groves which in cultivated area exceed everything of the kind in Italy and other South European countries.

Another advantageous circumstance in the

rapid development of the United States is the fact that the Americans were fortunate enough to encounter native inhabitants who only thinly populated the country. How different is the situation with the English in India, or other nations for that matter. There are thickly populated areas where the natives are hard to decimate and harder yet to civilize. Apparently, the native Indian population of America was never very great. Whatever remnants are left of it today submit to the superiority of the white race, docilely enjoying a modest subsistence.

It was on this thinly inhabited but extremely fertile soil that the American developed. It is surprising for the European to observe how uninformed Americans in general are regarding their racial origin, and how little interest they take in their descent. Races mingle and mix very quickly. Visiting smaller places, the traveler frequently gains two entirely different impressions, depending upon whether he is brought into contact with the younger or with the older generation. So far as the older generation is concerned, it is almost always possible to say: he is a Slav or an Italian, or a German, or a Jew, or Irish, or Swedish. That is to say, the older individual still shows certain racial characteristics. But in the second generation, the children have grown into full-fledged

Americans and it is usually extremely difficult to tell their racial descent.

While in the United States, I found the confirmation of an observation made elsewhere: the soil and the mode of living are more important in shaping physical features of face and body, of posture and other characteristics, than imaginary racial proclivities, frequently impossible or else very difficult to trace at all. There is no doubt that there is more German blood in the United States than it is possible to trace through statistics. There are many Brauns who have become Browns and many Schmidts who spell their names Smith and Müllers who call themselves Miller. Besides, we know that from time to time, Germany experienced lively periods of emigration. These were much more discernible in Germany and more far-flung than those experienced by England. Moreover, up to the very last decade, the German believed in big families. It is for this reason that, in America, the traveler continually runs across German names. I remember seeing football games in which more than half of the participants bore German names.

At any rate, it cannot be doubted that whatever inferior material may have emigrated to the United States from all over the world, it was, and is, numerically speaking, rather limited. Those who wanted to make their way in this

new country had to be endowed with courage and energy, intelligence and stamina. The determination and optimism—outstanding features in the American of today—might be to a certain extent a result of the more favorable living conditions which the American enjoys, but, in the greater measure, these characteristics are certainly a proof of the heritage which immigrating forebears brought to the new continent.

In view of those long drawn out and venomous racial contests which Europe suffers time and again, it is remarkable to observe how unanimous is the national feeling of the American. We Germans who, for centuries, were not permitted to enjoy existence in a national state, are likely to confound the conception "nation" with the meaning of "people," and then again confound the term "people" with the idea of "race." For the American, the term "nation" means just one great coöperative commonwealth which, in turn, constitutes her people. For the American, the statement: "I am an American citizen" has the same proud meaning as the *"civis Romanus sum"* had for the Roman. The feeling of respect that the American entertains toward his flag is greater than that which European nations show toward their individual emblems. So far as the President of the United States is concerned, he is more

representative of the nation as a whole, is much more influential and enjoys decidedly greater respect than any European monarch.

In the realm of economics, too, America succeeded in welding the people into one unit imbued with the same goal. The idea of "giving service" permeates the whole American nation, manifesting itself in practical application. It influences the American to a much greater extent than Kant's categorical imperative ever influenced the German nation. The American's idea of "serving" a common cause produces far better results, in the interest of the individual and in the interest of the commonwealth, than does the overabundance of communistic doctrines in which new Russia is steeped.

Almost each and every American fills a place in life commensurate with his ability. He is devoted to his work and undisturbed by the thought that his particular rung on the ladder of success might not be all to which he is entitled. Everybody glories in the fact that he is doing his work well, and is always ready to criticize the performance of the next man. The moving idea is to make the most of one's position. I once laid my hand on a book recommended to would-be American citizens for the acquisition of such knowledge as is necessary to obtain citizenship. The first chapter of this book deals with the discovery of America by

Columbus. Very significantly, the chapter is entitled "The Good Service of Columbus." This shows that, quite unconsciously, Columbus's achievement—to which we Europeans would refer as the heroic accomplishment of a good sailor—is simply considered in the light of "service." To be sure, one can justly say that the best service Columbus could ever have rendered so optimistic and deservedly proud a continent as America was by discovering it. In this conclusion, it is amusing to remember what a joke, in the history of the world, was the accidental discovery of the American continent. Columbus considered the new continent just a disturbing obstacle in his quest for a new course to India. Today, this very "obstacle," encountered hardly more than five hundred years ago, is ready to assume the leadership of the world.

There can be no doubt that the general development of America and her inhabitants was greatly enhanced by the American constitution. Its federalistic principle explains itself in the fact that, at the time of its conception, the thirteen original states were so distant from one another, and traveling conditions were so inadequate, that each one of the states necessarily had to foster its own development and could not afford to depend too much on the Federal

Government. Nevertheless, this federalistic spirit possesses no difficulties for the unity of the people, as a whole. In all political questions of national aspect, the people look upon their president as the appointed leader. The federalistic constitution implies no danger to American unity, because the people are intrinsically inclined to stand together. The same federalistic constitution might prove inimical to unity in Germany because Germany, through centuries, was split by the particularistic jealousy of princes and princelings. This naturally served to undermine a spirit of unanimity. However, the federalistic principle is perfectly safe for the United States as a country inherently committed to unitarian tendencies. Undoubtedly, an uncomplicated suffrage, although somewhat rough-hewn and not always adequate, in view of the absolute equality it attempts to maintain, contributed greatly to the unification of the American people.

Time and again, I debated at the round table of university circles the *pro* and *con* of Germany's proportional suffrage. I declared that we, in Germany, were not unanimously satisfied with the results produced by this method, only to be told that proportional suffrage would give the United States her only chance to elect a new third party—a party based on a new, practical platform, somewhat similar to the

Progressives. In view of these assertions I had to insist: "I am unable to say whether by proportional elections you will ever be able to create a Progressive Party. But I know beyond doubt that, by the way of proportional suffrage, you will encourage the organization of all kinds and shades of parties. You will undoubtedly induce a Negro Party and a Chinese Party, a Jewish and an Italian Party, a Farmers' Party and a Labor Party, a Prohibition Party and an Anti-Prohibition Party, a Catholic Party and a Methodists' Party and what not!" The American election system, as it is today, permits the achievement of particularistic aims only within the pale and with the support of the one or the other of the two big parties. This is utterly unlike Germany, where particularistic aims generally lead to the formation of factions. Such procedure, in the United States, would make it impossible to elect even one single Member of Congress. It is an established, though frequently overlooked fact, that the American system tends to unite the people while, on the other hand, the proportional formula, as practiced in Germany and other European countries, leads to disintegration.

The fact that this tremendous country, with a hundred and thirty million consumers, constitutes one unified economic entity, assists the

producer in the sale of his goods in a way which the European can hardly realize. To understand clearly the staggering disadvantage that faces the European producer compared to the American manufacturer and distributor, it is necessary only to remember how frequently European industrial enterprises—especially geared to the production of one article or another—are paralyzed by customs complications. Besides, the different currencies in use in Europe, and the fluctuating *valuta* to which these currencies are subject, greatly interfere with business. On the other hand, the American can make his plans on a much bigger scale, never troubling that tariff wars will interfere with the sale of his products. This condition shows up glaringly Europe's disadvantage as compared to America's much more fortunate condition.

Assured that the tremendous expanse of his own country guarantees him sufficient outlet, the American can resort to mass production. It is this possibility of mass production which also results in America's superiority in exporting merchandise in successful competition with most of the European countries. Besides, consumption in the United States is standardized and rationalized to a far greater extent than is possible in Europe. The American consumer just wants the identical thing that the next man

bought; he does not insist on anything special. In this way, it is possible in America to order, with the help of voluminous mail order catalogues, not only standardized cuff buttons or toothbrushes or automobiles, but also complete houses. All the prospective purchaser has to do is to order according to catalogue numbers. In department stores, only such goods are available as are assured of quick consumption and, in turn, only goods, quickly and regularly consumed, appeal to the personal taste of the individual American. As long as the American consumer does not insist on obtaining something out of the ordinary but sticks to standardized goods, he can buy comparatively cheaply; however, as soon as he tries to get something different from the general run of the mill production, he is forced to pay prices exorbitant in comparison with European standards. All these facts help to stimulate mass production. Mass production and mass distribution are also favored because, in the trades, there is no extensive middle-class resisting this economic trend. In new communities, this lack of middle-class tradespeople does not constitute a problem; they never bother to encourage this class because it is so much easier and so much more satisfactory to deal with big concerns.

A country whose superiority rests upon such natural foundations is logically in a position

to play a superior hand in the game of politics. However, the question remains whether such a country exploits, or feels the urge to exploit, such favorable circumstances in the sphere of applied politics.

Never has the United States been a pacifistic country. In the one hundred and fifty years of her existence, she has fought not less than twelve wars, but her full power only became manifest in the World War. I remember that, more than ten years before the outbreak of the War, I read Elisabeth von Heyking's best seller, *Letters That Never Reached Him.** The husband of the author was, at that time, the German Ambassador to Mexico. Many statements in the book appear, now, in the light of inspired prophecies. In the course of her novel, Mrs. von Heyking has a highly intelligent American make the remark that the surplus strength of his country was so tremendous that, one day, the United States might embark upon a war, not to safeguard material interests, but rather for the sake of ideals—real or imaginary—as a means of testing her own youthful strength. When I read this statement for the first time, I was rather skeptical because, then, the real nature of the United States and her inhabitants was more or less of an enigma for all of us.

**Briefe, die ihn nicht erreichten.*

Nevertheless, I am still at a loss to understand how it was possible for pre-Armistice German diplomacy to know so little about America in general. Even in the face of all the warnings cabled by Count von Bernstorff, then German Ambassador to Washington, *Wilhelmstrasse* assumed that the United States' entrance into the War would not amount to more than just a gesture. Berlin felt sure that the United States would never exert all her resources.

However, the War not only revealed to the Americans the inherent strength that is theirs, but also that this strength must never be squandered where no vital American interests are at stake. Since the War, American politics, on a much firmer basis, is tinged with not a little caution. Even if post-War America exerts wise restraint, there are still many interests in which she is engrossed. In the first place, the American sphere of interest embraces the entire American continent. So far as foreign policies are concerned, the Monroe Doctrine is the regulating principle. Even the fact that most of the South and Central American countries, as well as Canada, have joined the League of Nations did not suffice to diminish the importance of this Doctrine. There is no doubt in my mind that if ever a conflict should arise between the obligations of Central or South American countries to the League of Na-

tions and the Monroe Doctrine as such, this would amount to just a collision between a pot of earthenware and an iron kettle. The Tacna-Arica conflict between Chile and Peru, of more than thirty years' standing, was not settled through the good offices of the League of Nations, but rather through an understanding based on American arbitration between the two contesting governments. In the conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia, the League never made any really serious attempt at interference, analagous to the steps taken by Geneva in settling the difficulties between Greece and Italy in 1923. Moreover, after the conflict was settled, the South American countries, with their highly developed sense of independence, insisted that it was primarily through the good offices of the League of Nations that the settlement was consummated. Apparently, they preferred to give the credit to the League rather than to the United States.

There are many interesting aspects of relations between the United States and Canada. The Canadians, as such, are much more attached to Great Britain than they are to the American continent, but, on the other hand, the influence of the United States on the Dominion gains from year to year by leaps and bounds. It has been frequently stated, and justly so, that in Canada, the people are English while every-

thing else is American. There American diplomacy will have to mark time, and most probably for a good long while. Nevertheless, there is no possibility that if Canada were ever attacked, perhaps from beyond the Pacific Ocean —such an attack, by the way, being very remote —the United States would not consider this as an interference within her sphere of interest, and act accordingly. Neither the political nor the economic development of Canada can be a matter of unconcern to the United States.

Today, the interests of the United States reach far across the Pacific Ocean. China, now that she has come to understand that Moscow's interest in her was not so much an evidence of Russian solicitude in Chinese liberty, but rather a means of spreading Bolshevistic ideas, looks upon America as her best friend in her endeavor to remove the last remnants of European hegemony and Japanese interference. One contributing factor why America assumes the rôle of protector toward China is the traditional sentiment which still reminds America of her own War of Independence against the ethnographically related, but nevertheless "English," Great Britain of George III.

Australia, too, energetically fighting off immigration, although working on her own development with less impetus than the United States, looks upon the latter as her natural

ally, especially against colored immigration. In this respect Australia depends upon America almost more than on the mother country. It is here that America enjoys the indubitable advantage of a front line position; she can afford to wait until she is called upon whenever she is needed. So far as political influence on Europe is concerned, America is interested only as far as it is necessary and compatible with economic ends. American loans, of course, must be secured in Europe and American export markets maintained and extended. On the other hand, European immigration is accepted only to that extent to which it is still needed.

It is for all these reasons that America, since the War, has proceeded in her relations with Europe with extreme caution. When interference appeared necessary, she was careful to use only the tips of her fingers, so to speak. The United States did not even participate in the Versailles Treaty, preferring to conclude with Germany a separate peace untainted by the brutal methods in which the other victors indulged. German property, confiscated during the War, was voluntarily returned to the German owners by the United States, in order to maintain the international protection of private property. Those of her custodians who misused German property were brought to task. Besides, the United States withdrew her Army

of Occupation from the Rhineland long before all the other powers.

In 1920, when I was Secretary of State for the Interior—before peace with America was officially concluded—I traveled to the occupation zones. I called on the commanders of all the different occupation forces, and I also paid my respects to General Henry T. Allen, who did so much for the conciliation between the two countries. General Allen received me with these words, which may also be found in his Journal: "How is it possible for you to come and visit me? We are still enemies." To this, I made the reply: "I sincerely hope that all those with whom we are living at peace now, mean just as well toward us as you do under the state of war." The correctness of my statement was proved time and again in the ensuing decade. Among the great powers, Germany has no better friend than the United States. Never before was a foreign diplomat in Germany so popular as the warm-hearted, far-sighted, and untiringly active American ambassador, Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman. Berlin felt the greatest regret at his departure.

After the War, America interfered in European affairs only in emergencies. When, in the course of the Ruhr War, the brutal methods of French politics led into a blind alley, and when Europe was inextricably enmeshed in the

reparation chaos, it was only due to the initiative of the American, General Charles G. Dawes, that a plan for an economic reconstruction of Europe was evolved. Two years later, when the French franc depreciated rapidly, it was American credits that were put at the disposal of France to rehabilitate the French *valuta* and prevent a further aggravation of severe economic ailments of yet another European country. The Young Plan, too, which followed up the provisional Dawes Plan, was fashioned with cautious decision by American initiative. But here, too, the United States concluded a separate agreement with Germany in reference to her own reparation demands. Conditions, as laid down to this end in the American-German agreement, are more favorable for Germany than those stipulated by the other Allies in the Young Plan. The history of these last few years has proved that one hundred and thirty million Americans, without ever aspiring to such a task, were repeatedly called upon by four hundred and eighty million Europeans to wield a decisive influence on the fate of the older continent.

In view of the prominent political position which the United States enjoys, it is understandable from the American point of view—though deplorable from the viewpoint of the world at large—that America still refrains

from entering the League of Nations. America's motives are easy to perceive. She declines all entangling alliances that might embroil her in European difficulties. Nevertheless, from a more general aspect, there can be no doubt that it would be desirable if the League of Nations would be representative of humanity as a whole. The hope prevails that America will yet contribute to the great achievement of humanity as personified by the League of Nations once the spirit of war which imbues the world, but especially the European nations, is dimmed. This would tend to obliterate those armed difficulties which now cause America to remain outside the League. That America agreed to submit to the decision of The Hague tribunal may be interpreted as a step forward on the road to solidarity with all the other nations. Another good omen is the Kellogg Pact, whose disapproval of war as an instrument of national policy exceeds by far similar clauses in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Despite the fact that American politics proceeds very carefully, the impartial observer cannot fail to notice that the future development of the United States, in reference to the world at large, will not be one of too smooth sailing. The United States of today enjoys her superiority over the rest of humanity not only on the strength of her inherent wealth in raw

materials. In addition to this overwhelming advantage, she has now changed from a debtor nation to a creditor nation, to whom almost the whole world is under obligation. Before the War, the United States owed Europe four billion dollars—money she had raised in the older continent to build up her country and to develop her tremendous industry. Today, the world is under an indebtedness of five billion dollars to America; out of this sum, fully four billion is *owed* by Europe. The entire contemporary world is indebted to America.

To amortize the principal and to pay the running interest to America is made so much more difficult by the fact that America surrounds herself with high tariff walls. This procedure is entirely different from Great Britain's method when she was the debtor nation of the world. At that time, Great Britain opened her frontiers to free trade, thus making it easier for the creditors to discharge their obligations. Then, there is a third fact to be considered. America is not absorbing the surplus humanity which her country, in view of natural wealth and capital, could easily shelter. America is monopolizing capital, as well as work, in her own interests. The disparity between the United States and the rest of the world threatens to become more and more aggravated. All the dollars which American

travelers may carry to Europe, all the munificent support which America gives to the needy of Europe, all the far-flung assistance which she renders to European arts and sciences, are not sufficient to bridge this disparity.

A striking picture of this tremendous chasm is furnished by the fact that the American per capita income amounts to six hundred dollars, while Germany, even during the best pre-War years, never yielded more than a hundred and eighty dollars per year a person, and in 1924 even as little as one hundred dollars. Such conditions make the lot of the contemporary European appear a rather sad one. Of course, Europe did not stumble innocently into the deplorable state of affairs in which she finds herself today. Contributing factors to the inimical developments were Europe's great wars, her excessive armaments, and customs and other demarcation lines which hamper progress in general. This condition was made worse by a growing anarchism in the political organization of Europe induced by the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, even a Europe making the very most of all her potentialities could never hope to improve her condition to such an extent as to catch up with America's tremendous head start as long as America studiously detaches herself from Europe.

Nobody will believe that such conditions and

developments will ever give rise to armed conflicts; firstly in view of America's geographical situation, and next on account of a generally growing pacific sentiment. I therefore disagree with Julius Hirsch when he insists in his book, *The American Economic Wonder,** that America's interest in general disarmament is more or less dictated by apprehensions in military respects. Nevertheless, the alienation between America and the rest of the world is bound to grow, for the simple reason that America constitutes only one-fifteenth of the entire population of the globe, at the same time enjoying a position of enviable superiority. In view of these facts, the idea does not seem so preposterous that the rest of humanity may come to disown a one-sided capitalistic and individualistic system in order to take up Socialistic or even Bolshevistic principles. In all European parliaments, Bolshevistically inclined radicals time and again raise the bugaboo of "the reign of Wall Street."

No doubt serious danger may arise from the fact that America is shutting herself off from the rest of the world. I sincerely believe that all the well-meaning statesmen of the world should consider, together with American states-

Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder.

men, how this state of affairs could be improved.

However, these are worries which pertain to a more distant future. The same conditions which made America great—raw materials, climate, invulnerability and the American *per se*—will, however, remain unchanged. There is no hint on the horizon of the world which bodes a position of lesser importance on the part of America. For this reason, the United States, independent of foreign assistance, will decline to enter alliances or sign agreements which pre-suppose her interference in world conflicts. Some fifty years ago, an English statesman spoke of Great Britain's "splendid isolation." That was at the very time when England was not enmeshed in the net of European alliance—politics. The boast of a "splendid isolation" holds true today, when applied to America, more than it ever did in the case of England. After the disappointing experiences she had during and after the World War, America is bound to detach herself from all international conflicts which do not concern her directly. It may merely be expected that the United States, on rare occasions, will take a hand, but then only in cases where she will be permitted to assume the high office of judge of the world, without incurring too great a risk.

Russia Secedes from Europe

The world at large, to which post-War Germany must adjust herself, presents a striking picture of the ascendency of non-European powers and the simultaneous and unmistakable decline of European influence in international politics. One important contributing factor to Europe's growing political demoralization is Russia's Bolshevism. Since embracing the tenets of the Red creed, Russia can no longer claim to be a European power. Visiting Russia's cities or traveling over her vast steppes, one is surprised to discover how closely connected is the Bolshevist movement with Russia's century-old, deeply rooted aversion to the West-European civilization which was forced upon her by the Czars. The Red revolution was successful, to more than a small extent, because it was aided and abetted by Asiatic instincts, ever antagonistic to a foreign, never completely absorbed civilization.

Within the boundaries of Russia, the idea of Bolshevism may by now have lost part of its victorious paroxysm. Since the Bolsheviks came into power, they have changed from martyrs ready to suffer crucifixion, to High Priests, ever prepared to nail infidels to the cross. Their faith has been exalted to a dogma while their political beliefs have taken on the dignity

of new principles of statesmanship. Russia is by no means facing the danger of a White reaction. If Russia remains unsuccessful in finding her way to an economic evolution, such as Lenin seemed to espouse, the U. S. S. R. are headed for a commercial and cultural fall. This decline will be accelerated if Russia's powers that be insist upon making the open country submit to the same communistic economic ideas forced by the bizarre mood of a despot upon a few million industrial workers in the cities. In Russia's agricultural regions, more than a hundred million farmers cling to an economic system which is decidedly not capitalistic, permitting each farmer to till his own soil for himself in his own fashion. Whatever their needs are, these farmers are compelled today to buy from socialized industries at prices much too high, selling their own produce at prices much too low. At the same time, the Russian farmers are paying exorbitant taxes. Although the farmers themselves are in rags, the entire economic structure of the entire state rests upon their shoulders. The economic stamina of the farming populace will completely disappear if socialization in agricultural districts is actually enforced.

In political feuds in Russia, the party that unfurls the red flag is the only one that has a chance to win. Divergence of opinion, now prev-

alent in Russia, centers around the question: who is the genuine prophet of the Great God Lenin? Russia's younger generation, having turned away from foreign countries and all that they stand for, is completely under the spell of Bolshevism. It might be possible, perhaps, to change their ideas but it will prove utterly impossible to de-Bolshevize this younger generation entirely. Besides, it must not be forgotten that there is a technical background to every revolution. The party which controls the armament, the railroads and the wireless, will ever remain victor. There is not the slightest sign that Russia's army is tiring of Bolshevism.

It is an historical fact that radical ideas, once they have lost their first fervor, prove the more practical for propagation in foreign countries. The French revolution entered upon its victorious march all over Europe only after it had reached its peak in France. The Soviet government has been partly successful in spreading the Bolshevist idea all over the world. Inoculating them with its doctrines, Bolshevism succeeded in arousing the colored populations of Asia and even of Africa against the Europeans on not only one, but two counts: firstly, as nationalistic oppressors, and secondly as capitalistic exploiters. Developments in China clearly show that the seed of nationalistic and racial

prejudices is bearing fruit. However, Bolshevism as such did not succeed in establishing itself there. During the last few years, Russia's influence has lost considerable ground in Asia because of the growing distrust on the part of Asiatics of education and property. It was they who successfully blocked the dull instincts of the inarticulate masses.

Immediately after the World War, Russia attempted to light the torch of revolution all over Europe. In her campaign against Poland, Russia endeavored to take Europe unawares by military means. Today, Russia is still trying to bluff Europe by diplomatic tricks. There is no let-up in the Bolshevist attempt to undermine the social structures of western powers. Russia is indulging in a game in which she is playing both ends from the middle. While, on the one hand, she flirts with the Western powers, whose financial assistance she badly requires, on the other hand, she is threatening the economic fabric of these very powers in the interest of Bolshevist propaganda. But so long as Western powers, on account of lacking solidarity, and urged by their own economic wants, find it necessary to cater to Russia, it will be impossible to call a halt to Russia's intrigue. For the time being, of course, there seems to be no opportunity for Russia to take immediate action against Europe. It is for this reason

that Russia is content to accept, at present, the rôle of a cunning observer, ready to leap into the fray at a moment's notice. On the other hand, aggressive measures taken by an outside power against Russia would be certain to cause dire results. Russia cannot be conquered by military means. It is impossible to weaken her, from the outside, by revolutionary methods. Intervention of any kind would only serve to strengthen Russia's national pride. Any attempt to destroy Russia by an economic blockade would invite the danger of an explosion which might prove disastrous not only to Russia, but to Europe at large.

The entire non-European world is entertaining serious doubts as to whether European supremacy as a whole has proved beneficial or harmful. The farther European culture is disseminated, educating the higher strata of non-European peoples to independent thinking, the more grave grows this doubt. The more the indigenous, frequently very highly developed cultures of these countries disappear and the more their educated classes look upon themselves as Europeans, the more intense grows their nationalistic resistance to European supremacy. Their striving for independence and equality is growing apace. For years and years Europe indulged in the bugaboo of the "yellow danger" despite the fact that it was Europe's na-

tions themselves who were the aggressors. Today, it is the "white danger" that is dreaded. Non-European nations, with growing resentment, refuse to be used as pawns on the chessboard of conflicting European interests.

The British Empire

It is England's task to hold the front-line position in a defensive battle against the non-European races. It is for this reason that for many years England has suffered economically, at the same time being threatened politically. Under the government of her Conservatives, England went too far afield in this contest. However, the inborn instinct of the British for equalization and moderation persisted once more. Her Labour Government is assiduously working to eliminate frictions induced by an over-zealous imperialism. At a recent League of Nations convention in Geneva, England proceeded very cleverly under the leadership of Ramsay MacDonald. She succeeded in arousing hopes of future equality and sovereignty in the Chinese and the Egyptians. At the present time, England is gradually detaching herself from her dangerous position of pioneering for a too oppressive European Imperialism.

Great Britain is the pivotal power which bears the brunt of the resistance of non-

European nations against European interference. The British Empire constitutes the logical link between Europe and the non-European world. Upon this fact rests England's inherent strength in her dealings with her dominions and colonies. Without the superiority England derives from her European culture, her overseas dependencies would see in the mother country nothing more than a small, martially inclined nation, imbued with a will to power but whose time by now has past. The manner in which England, up to the present time, has succeeded in retaining her dominions as integral parts of the Empire, proves once more her evolutionary potentialities. We Germans, even we post-War Germans, are still too much influenced by the traditional belief that an empire can be welded into a cohesive unit only through authority and discipline. There is nothing of the kind in England's relations to her dependencies. It is necessary only to peruse telegrams exchanged between the Canadian Prime Minister and the British Prime Minister at the outbreak of the War and after the Armistice to ascertain that, while during the dangers of War the colonies loyally stood by the mother country, as soon as the cataclysm had come to an end, the dominions raised their voices, insisting that they be heard. So far as Canada's relation to the mother country is concerned, the

extremely workable formula has been evolved, permitting her to be mistress in her own house but only a daughter in her mother's house. This formula is also applied to all the other dominions. The first part of the formula is observed with severe punctiliousness. So far as the second part is concerned, from the way the daughters manifest interest in their mother's affairs, it may be gathered that they are rather emancipated daughters. Everywhere, the right to a full and equal participation in all matters of importance is insisted upon and successfully obtained by the dominions.

And little as the British Empire depends upon political cohesion, even less does it rely upon economic coöperation. In fact, the more dominions and colonies thrive under the protection of British world power, endowed with all the traditions of English constitutionality, the more successful they prove themselves in their own economic sphere, and the more quickly they emancipate themselves, economically, from the motherland. An economic self-sufficiency of the British Empire is impractical, because products of the motherland, as of the dominions, are in general limited to a few important and well-paying items. For this reason, the motherland, on the one hand, and dominions and colonies on the other, would not find sufficiency in exchanging products, but

have to maintain import and export relations with the world at large.

The contact between England and her dominions is primarily based on common cultural and spiritual assets. The eternal bourne of England's strength replenishes itself in the fact that her dominions hail her as the dispenser of English civilization. English civilization is easily acquired and comfortable. At the same time, England's disciples are imbued with traditions of a glorious past along with a sense of honesty and decorum. In times of danger, the British influence upon dominions and colonies will always prove strong enough to convince her disciples that the British cause is a just one, and that it is nothing more than the ethical duty of the dependencies to fall in line. I do not share the skepticism with which many refer to the change of the "Empire" into a "Commonwealth."

In the course of the last decade, in her relations with her colonies and their colored populations, England proved herself somewhat less adaptable to the spirit of our time. Nevertheless under the sway of the late Conservative Government, the necessity of improving this state of affairs was readily admitted. Plans to ameliorate relations, especially of India to the British Empire, are carried on in a none too radical manner, which time and again gives

the impression that English politics are advancing at a phlegmatic pace. So far as Ceylon is concerned, her change to home rule has progressed much farther. It may be taken for granted that the Labour Government will proceed with more determination than the Conservative. For the first time a native representative of India recently sat at the deliberations of the League of Nations. The problem, however, whether faction-torn India could be given autonomy, is extraordinarily difficult. I was rather embarrassed at the congress of the Liberal English Party, when, in the course of a discussion, I was asked how Germany would proceed if India belonged to her. Nevertheless, here also, it appears that experienced English politics will solve the dilemma before it is too late.

Although English industries in post-War times frequently suffered severe setbacks, and although English employers and employees lack the elasticity and the proclivity for hard work, which the Germans fortunately possess, Great Britain's economic situation is vastly more fortunate and less precarious than that of Germany. More and more, England is developing into a country of financiers. The tremendous head start England enjoys in comparison with countries relying mostly on their industries—products of which must be exported

in order to import sufficient foodstuffs—becomes clear from the fact that annually, England derives not less than four hundred million pounds sterling from her over-seas enterprises and investments. On the other side of the ledger, the complete import balance for England—a country so very poor in agrarian products—shows approximately the same sum.

It is a fallacy to look upon England as a non-European country. England's strength rests upon the respect that European culture commands throughout the world. There is no other country whose culture takes root more firmly in European classicism and Christianity than England. It is also wrong to speak of the two Anglo-Saxon powers as cultural or political twins. The continental European makes this mistake because both those nations speak the same language, a fact which naturally makes it easier to bridge chasms created by propaganda. Both countries have a penchant for great ideas. Both will concentrate on such ideas no longer than is profitable; they cling, consciously or unconsciously, only to those ideas that yield an advantage. England may be classified as the last European stronghold against the Americanization of Europe.

The Decline of European World Influence

The purposeful efforts of non-European countries and England are opposed by a Balkanized Europe. Compared to pre-War times, there are now 35 states instead of 26, and 27 currencies instead of 30. There are 38 different customs zones instead of 26, with customs frontiers lengthened by 11,000 kilometers. Nowhere else in the world is peace so insecurely established as in Europe. There is only one thing in which Europe stands really unified: the overestimation of her own importance to the world at large—a myth in which she still likes to indulge. There is no trace of a unified resolution of Europe to fight for the maintenance of her world influence and the preservation of her culture.

What is the New Europe? Dismembered old countries, new countries whose majorities, unprepared, suddenly have been lifted from subjugation to the pinnacle of power only to find their country overrun with racial minorities. Instead of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy with her permanent internal frictions, the New Europe looks upon successive states with badly delineated boundaries, indulging in external squabbles; a Balkan not tranquilized; a dissatisfied Poland; new dictatorships whose support and only hope is the sword!

So far as Europe's economic state is concerned, there is no European market comparable to the American, offering to progressive industries vast and secure commercial expansion. Even the smaller countries of Europe aim at industrial self-sufficiency. Commercial treaties are concluded for short terms or provisionally only. Thus, they hardly assist in the improvement of conditions created by high tariffs, enacted for the protection of the more important industries of the countries concerned. In European commercial politics, a great leading thought is sadly missing.

Sociological difficulties that beset Europe are more pronounced than ever today. Tired of the tyranny of capitalism and vacillating between Bolshevism and Fascism, Europe is blindly groping for a way out.

CHAPTER II

DOCTRINES OF THE POST-WAR WORLD

Nationalism

The world is not ruled by interests alone, but also by ideas. An idea is the most potential political power. While only actual work will build a road, it is the basic idea that sets the course in the right direction. During the World War, we Germans came to understand how powerful were those ideas which induced our enemies to drive their peoples against us. I cannot agree with the objection: so many ideas, so many subterfuges. There always will be leaders misusing ideas for pretexts. Frequently, an idea is seized upon and misused by one whose skirts are none too clean. But no nation is so docile that it will stand being driven on for the sake of an idea when that idea is revealed as a subterfuge. Germany jockeyed herself into an isolated position during the World War because she disregarded the power of an idea, or at least neglected propagating this idea. The new Germany is proceeding along the right road in endeavoring to develop and propagate ideas more quickly than the na-

tions that emerged victoriously from the Great War.

It is self-evident that any statesman will scrutinize an idea from the viewpoint of benefit to his own people. Under the force of facts, every foreign policy is national-egotistical in the most sublime conception of this term. Only in less developed nations, and in the squabble of petty party politics, can this fact be denied.

Even today the idea of Nationalism is imbued with a terrific power, and is just as strongly entrenched as ever before—more so perhaps beyond the boundaries of Europe than in Europe herself. The rehabilitation of Turkish power in Asia Minor and the awakening of China were brought about by Nationalism. There is a driving desire filling the peoples of this earth to graduate, in the realm of politics and world economics, from objects to subjects. A Persian minister, interviewed in Berlin, very simply and decidedly replied to the question whether a certain compatriot of his was pro-Russian or pro-English: "He is like all of us—pro-Persian!" The white peoples of the Near East are thoroughly imbued with this sentiment. China is sparing neither time nor blood to bring this idea to a happy realization. Even black peoples no longer seem immune against such aspiration.

For most of the European peoples the na-

tionalistic idea has reached its goal; of course, not without subjecting vanquished nations to injustice, especially Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. The victors in the Great War, even in doubtful cases, have interpreted the nationalistic idea in their own favor. Wherever the nationalistic idea miscarried, as in the South-Tyrol, geographical subterfuges were employed. However, this very attempt to impose Nationalism successfully on all the nations of Europe has proved that to the east and the southeast of Germany and Italy it is impossible any longer to create genuine nationalistic states. In those regions, nations are overlapping one another to such an extent that even within the boundaries of tiny villages, several nations are assembled. The experiment, in such cases, to create national order out of racial chaos, along the line of the West-European idea of the nationalistic state, has totally miscarried. Even the attempt to exchange the inhabitants of the divers settlements led to bloodshed and general calamity the farther one proceeded towards the South and the Southeast of Europe. Turkey, by expelling the Greeks, deprived herself of her most important economic assets, not unlike Spain when she drove out the Jews and the Moors. Even many decades hence, the wounds which Turkey suffered from the expulsion of the Greeks will not have healed.

Additional cause for severe friction, especially in the East and the Southeast of Europe, is furnished by the attempt to bring about denationalization through legislative measures and administrative means. Minorities, as a rule, prove much more stubborn than is generally anticipated. It is in the resistance which these minorities offer that the nationalistic idea manifests itself. The nationalistic ideal of the majority, however, is not as unified because majorities attempt to propagate the superiority of their own race while at the same time endeavoring to assimilate other races. Where a racial fanaticism will not tolerate any other race, it becomes unbearable for a majority to see its own racial qualities weakened by the assimilation of allegedly inferior elements. Only by recognizing the rights of minorities will the nationalistic ideals of the East and the Southeast of Europe attain a new and higher level.

Nationalism runs amuck when it develops into overbearing racial arrogance. It is easier for Switzerland and Canada than for any other countries to keep themselves free from such difficulties. In these two countries, the peaceful propinquity of divers races within the boundaries of one state is a matter of course. To them a nation, in accordance with English and French conception, means nothing other than

symbiotic coöperation. It is only on the strength of racial arrogance that Russia refers to herself as "the state of the future," and the French speak of themselves as *"la grande nation,"* while the English claim to be "the chosen people." The Germans, on the other hand, insist that their ways will lead to the salvation of the world. The statements out of Mussolini's own mouth, claiming a world mission for Italy, are legion. The modesty with which the individual in daily life speaks of his person and his abilities is still deplorably undeveloped in the public life of nations.

Imperialism

Under a delusion of racial superiority, nationalism repeatedly overreaches itself and waxes imperialistic. The reasons for this development are varied. In uncivilized peoples, it was the enjoyment of power and loot; in the Romans, the highly developed urge for an organized state; in the torchbearers of religious creeds, a holy zealousness; in the Bolshevists, the fanaticism of a political idea.

Stronger than all these diversified manifestations of imperialism is the commercial imperialism of today. Spheres of influence are eagerly sought after for the sake of exploiting raw materials and creating outlets for merchandise,

as well as finding new fields for safe investments. Peoples who resist the inroads of Imperialism are generally considered backward. It is against them that the exertion of political power becomes necessary. These are the very reasons for English expansion all over the world, and also for the very policy resorted to by the United States in her dealings with Mexico and with smaller states of Central America. The more peoples succumb to the blessings of European civilization, the less necessary is the employment of actual force to open their realms to Commercial Imperialism, and the more frequently pacific penetration proves successful. Wars are a gamble and not unlike a double-edged sword. There are many threats and bluffs, but the sword is unsheathed reluctantly only. The more or less accepted procedure of present-day commercial imperialism consists of the peaceful methods of treaties, alliances and mandatory grants. In dealings with commercial rivals, imperialism avails itself of the expedient of dividing the world into spheres of interest. Thus imperialism which tries to remain peaceful as long as possible, may be looked upon as a link to that pacifism which, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, has been proposed to the world as a new ideal.

Pacifism

Pacifism, especially in Germany, is frequently looked upon with suspicion. German statesmen do not like to use the term pacifism. In France, on the other hand, men such as Poincaré are prone to dress up their policies with the cloak of pacifism. Many within the boundaries of Germany who propagate pacifism are not entirely guiltless of the misinterpretation this term now suffers. Pacifism is an idea, but by no means a political method. How far a nation may proceed in translating pacifism into actuality depends not only upon that particular nation alone, but also upon the reaction of its neighbors. The Jews in Palestine, in their relations with the Arabs, are utterly unable to advance the idea of pacifism as a political measure. What else can they do but defend themselves against brute strength? The advice of *Die Rote Fahne** that the Jewish working people should join the working Arabs against Jewish and British bourgeoisie, is nothing but a fantastic commonplace. The premise would be to create a working and peace-loving Arab people.

And Germany? For Germany, pacifism may mean a meek admittance on the part of the

**The Red Flag*, published in Berlin, is the organ of the German Communist Party.

Germans that theirs is the sole War guilt. It may also mean that Germany intends to foster and utilize her relations with foreign countries in order to destroy the War guilt lie. Pacifism in Germany may be interpreted as a readiness to discard, or curtail greatly, the *Reichswehr.** On the other hand, pacifism may mean to the Germans that the Geneva Disarmament Conference should insist upon the whole world disarming just as Germany was forced to do under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Pacifism may also be construed as indicating that Germany stands ready to accept the unjust Treaty of Versailles permanently and with good grace. It may indicate that we Germans consider it our foremost task to try to replace the Versailles Treaty with an understanding conducive to genuinely pacific coöperation among the nations. Pacifism of the one brand will find no fertile soil among a people beaten to their knees and treated unfairly; the other reveals itself as a great and holy idea, believing in the progress of the human race and, at the same time, furnishing the only possible basis upon which a German foreign policy may be founded. Such a pacifism is the last resort of the practical politician. It is the only weapon

*The *Reichswehr* is the standing national army consisting of volunteers, and by stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, limited to 100,000 men.

of which Germany, utterly deprived of other arms, may avail herself.

In general, the pacifism of today is the result of war fatigue. It is also nourished by books, plays, and pictures depicting the harsh realities of war. Such war stories, war plays and films, disregarding national boundaries, have become the common property of all people. The results and reactions of the late War particularly were felt by the entire populace—whether fighting in the trenches or back at the home front—more severely than any war witnessed by Europe in many a century. Besides, the chasm between those who actually suffered the hardships of war, and those who only editorialized on them, was much greater at the time of absolutism than at this time when all over the world—even under dicatorships—the influence exerted by the broad masses of people on the policy of the government is in the ascendency. Moreover, wars of today are unchivalrous; to express the view of contemporary youth, modern warfare is unsportsmanlike. War, as Albrecht Haushofer convincingly points out, is actually becoming a technical impossibility within the boundaries of Europe, at a time when long-range guns cannot be employed any longer in field battles. Almost all European capitals are within the range of

enemy cannon. Within the limited boundaries of Europe, it is nowadays next to impossible to gather sufficient momentum for a decisive stroke. Furthermore, war has outlived itself at a time when means of communication between nations are highly developed. Since the economic fabric of the whole world is interwoven so closely, not only the vanquished nation suffers through a war, but the victorious one also. Then, too, in our time when differences between classes are so greatly intensified and propaganda by conscientious objectors likely to be so efficient as to hamper the full mobilization of all physical and economic assets of any one nation, war endangers the foundation of a state. Each lost battle throws open the gates to the revolutionists. Verily, war, nowadays, is a bad business.

Resentment of war, however, still differs greatly from genuine pacifistic convictions. This resentment is just an offshoot of the imperialism discussed in a previous section. Commercial imperialism avails itself of peace as a means of protecting property. Peace is desired in order to insure commercial agreements. The fact that at Paris, the President of the German *Reichstag,* Löbe, was not permitted to speak on the subject of European understanding, because shortly before, in Vienna, he had dwelt upon *Anschluss,* is proof

of how far such pacifism is removed from genuine freedom of thought. This pacifism reminds one of Metternich's Holy Alliance. It is the pacifism of the man who has all he wants; it is the very same pacifism which does not interest the hungry ones at all.

Opposed to this conservative pacifism is a progressive pacifism—a pacifism that admits that we have not yet arrived at practical bases for peaceful coöperation, but must still search for it in an unhampered exchange of thought with one another. Progressive pacifism holds that the fact that there is no actual war in progress, for the time being, does not constitute genuine peace. Only a progressive pacifism will assist in realizing the ideal of world peace. Only in a world no longer subjected to havoc wrought by wars but rather evolved by way of peaceful discussions and peaceful settlements of difficulties by recognized authorities, will it be possible to avoid disastrous changes from inertia to explosion. Treaties such as those between the European powers and China will not last eternally, in view of the cultural emancipation of the Chinese race. Instead of such treaties, a supra-national authority must be created with sufficient powers to abrogate them. Otherwise, these treaties will one day be abolished by sheer force of arms as in the case of the Turkish capitulations. The supra-

national authority should be empowered to liberate subjugated nations and protect racial minority. From the chaos of an unorganized mingling of the nations, a supra-national world constitution must be arrived at by way of a thorough understanding among all the countries. The idea of might must give way to right, but this right must not be too conservative and unyielding; rather, it must be a pliable conception of right and sensitive to evolution. In this respect, discussions carried on recently at the meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Berlin are pointing the way. At this meeting, the question was aired whether existing treaties, under all circumstances, are entitled to protection, or whether a supra-national authority might be empowered to abrogate them, provided changed conditions should make such a course advisable. A compromise was finally arrived at which furthered the progressive idea greatly. The airing of this question and similar questions will be continued before the forum of the League of Nations. So far as Germany's future and her salvation are concerned, she is eagerly looking forward to the organization of a supra-national authority which will not only protect the old peace, but serve to create a new one.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY FROM 1919 TO 1930

Pre-War Germany

Germany's history of suffering goes much farther back than to the Armistice. Aside from a few occasions, when, in their thousand-year-old history, the German people reached those heights which by right should be theirs in view of their industry, mentality and valor, their political lot has been an undeservedly sad one. This deplorable fact was, in the first place, induced by Germany's geographical position: she is *the* Central European country. If Russia is no longer counted as an integral part of Europe, the Germans are the only genuine Continentals among all the big powers of Europe. All the other nations are more or less insular or peninsular peoples. Her geographical position is at once the reason for Germany's strength within a peaceful Europe, and the grounds for her weakness in case of a European war. Germany's boundaries, in almost all directions, are exposed to enemy attacks. Germany's coastline does not reach the open ocean, and is therefore easily blockaded.

Another factor contributing to Germany's precarious position appears in the history of her constitution. When France was weakened by the strife of feudal factions, Germany stood comparatively united. However, at the time when France consolidated herself around a centralized government, Germany showed a tendency to split up into smaller independent states which, eventually, constituted themselves as sovereign states. To make matters worse, religious wars rent Germany asunder. The highest types of Germans rebelled against the *Reich*. Frederick the Great, laying the foundation for the rise of Prussia, could achieve his aims only by concluding an alliance with France against Austria and South Germany. He paid for this Alliance with Alsace. It has never been Germany's happy lot to live in the sunshine of undisturbed peace; sinister clouds of an impending attack by powerful enemies always darkened her political horizon. For centuries the Turks sapped the strength of Austria. The Prussian-Baltic knights in the East surrendered before the force of the Poles. The French kings never left off scheming to extend the frontier of their country to the Rhine. To Napoleon, Germany merely represented a jumping-off place for his battle against England. And Bismarck, even after fighting vic-

torious wars, could never free himself completely from the "Nightmare of Coalitions."

The World War and the peace treaty intensified Germany's predicament until it became almost unbearable. I shall not dwell here on the reasons that led to the outbreak of the late War. Neither shall I attempt to explain the outcome of the War. However, I cannot refrain from emphasizing the fact that out of fifty-four possible governments in the whole world, at the end of the War no less than twenty-seven were arrayed in arms against Germany and her allies. Even after Russia had left the ranks of the Allied and Associated Powers, no less than seventy per cent of the inhabited globe and seventy-seven per cent of all its inhabitants combined in the coalition of Germany's enemies. In the face of this tremendous superiority in fighting power, such as the world never witnessed before, Germany broke down after bravely staving off the tide for years. Forced to submit to the conditions of the Armistice, she eventually signed the Treaty of Peace under duress.

The Treaty of Versailles

Under the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany lost 70,579,000 square kilometers of her realm, that is, thirteen per cent of

her entire domain. Germany was forced to disown ten per cent of her entire population; fully six per cent of these speak German as their native tongue. She lost her colonies with almost three million square kilometers and more than twelve million inhabitants. An additional six per cent of her domain was subjected to military occupation. To make matters still worse, Germany suffered the loss of fifty per cent of her iron ore production, twenty-five per cent of her hard coal assets, eighty per cent of her zinc output, seventeen per cent of her potatoes, sixteen per cent of her rye, and thirteen of her wheat. East Prussia, by fault of insufficiently informed and helpless statesmen, was reduced by the victors to the status of a political island, a relapse into conditions of international law which, in the nineteenth century, seemed definitely discarded. Silesia was greatly jeopardized by her new boundaries. Today Germany's capital is not more than one hunderd and fifty kilometers distant from the Eastern frontier of the *Reich*. The seacoast, never greatly extended, was reduced by an additional seventeen per cent.

In addition, the *Anschluss*—the union of Austria and the *Reich*—which after the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy appeared nothing less than logical, and which would constitute only the most elementary application of national

self-determination, cannot be realized without the unanimous consent of the League of Nations. Surrounded by nations armed to their very teeth, Germany's army was reduced far below the military strength of the new and smaller countries to the East and Southeast. Germany's fleet was thoroughly emasculated. In financial affairs and matters of communication, Germany's sovereignty was limited, while, at the same time, a large part of the economic strength of the nation was pressed into service, in the interest of reparation payments.

The Treaty of Versailles is an instrument of subjugation. It ignored Wilson's promises. The very ideas that were propagated in order to arouse the whole world against Germany—especially the idea of national self-determination and the right of the majorities—were utterly disregarded in the Treaty.

I was always opposed to the signing of the Treaty. As a matter of fact, I employed all my influence against the acceptance of the Treaty stipulations. The party to which I belong seceded from the government because we felt that we could not assume the responsibility of accepting the dictate of Versailles. Today, however, looking back over ten years, I must admit that I am no longer certain that my actions at that particular time were judicious. In politics, it is always easy to side with those who

lost their cause because later on it is possible to insist that things would have been better had the opposition won out. It is the winners who are held responsible for actual conditions. Reality, however, is not all light, but full of shadows. Nothing is easier than to criticize facts. Nevertheless, it must be admitted today that the opposition to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles rested upon the view that Germany, under the stipulations of this dictate, seemed condemned to decline and suffer utter extinction. It was assumed that an impoverished Germany would consume herself in bloody civil wars, in the end falling an easy prey to Bolshevism. Under the sway of the Treaty of Versailles, a renaissance, be it ever so gradual, seemed absolutely impossible.

Today, in spite of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany lives and works, rehabilitating herself before the eyes of the whole world. In view of this, the question is timely whether, refusing to sign the Treaty of Versailles, a disappointed and embittered, disunited, weakened, and emaciated people would have been able to summon up enough energy to resist renewed military thrusts of the enemy, without breaking down completely. That such enemy thrusts were in the offing, that they would have been delivered with a terrific impetus, I do not doubt, having satisfied myself how deeply rooted the

bitterness, how tightly knit the unity, and how unbending the decisions of our opponents were. There is no longer any doubt in my mind that the enemy peoples would have supported their governments in their aim to destroy completely a stubborn Germany. One only needs to remember how Lloyd George won the Khaki elections with the slogan of the "knock-out," and how, in France, years and years after the War, the people, time and again, were reassured: *"Le boche payera tout."*

At any rate, the Treaty of Versailles furnished a political platform for the ensuing ten years in the sense that armed resistance had come to an end. It is impossible for a nation to rise in arms against financial subjugation after she has lost important provinces of her realm.

Negotiations Under Duress

The Treaty of Versailles was far from being a definite settlement. All sorts of temporary expedients were resorted to in order to make this "peace instrument" workable. There were, for example, the plebiscites for the purpose of deciding the question what territory Germany would have to give up. So as to be able to specify the amounts of reparations, financial investigations were made. So far as all these negotiations are concerned, especially

those intended to settle financial problems between Germany and her late opponents, history can hardly refer to them as "negotiations," at least as far as the first series of those conferences were concerned. Terror and brute force were rampant at these meetings. Only after 1923, when developments in the Ruhr had clearly shown where terror was liable to lead, conferences in the *real* sense of the word were started, ushering in possibilities for tangible results.

Germany's politics, during the years 1919 to 1923, under the ever-present pressure of threatened force, certainly lacked heroism. They could never have been heroic under the circumstances. Germany was dealing with opponents who, whenever they would show the least readiness to impose new indignities and still harsher terms on the vanquished country, could firmly depend on the unanimous support of their respective peoples. On the other hand, Germany, torn by party strife, was always easy to club into acceptance of new demands by the simple expedient of prolonging the hunger blockade. And at this particular time, the German people knew one overpowering desire: Food!

It is utterly wrong to classify German statescraft of this particular period as a policy influenced by pacifistic motives. I am under the impression that many who, at that time, supported

such policies, did so only under protest. They assented because they were convinced that any attempt at fighting would inescapably lead to our opponents giving Germany the *coup de grâce*. Germany's politics of these years are best explained by stating that they were employed under duress. Resistance at that particular juncture had to be pliable under all circumstances. That is to say, we had to give in just at the right moment when it became obvious that further protests would be useless, inviting only fresh outrages. Because of this situation Germany agreed to pay indemnities for her fleet sunk at Scapa Flow. For the selfsame reason, we acceded to the demands of the victors when, during the time of most severe communistic danger, we dispatched troops into the demilitarized Ruhr region. We did this merely to prevent a calamity which threatened France, too. France countered by imposing new sanctions and occupying additional Rhineland territory. Only once, in all that time, did Germany induce her opponents to yield to her demands. That was when so-called war criminals were to be surrendered to the victors. In this instance, we succeeded in our resistance only because the Anglo-Saxon world could very well understand Germany's sentiment, agreeing with us that it was an outrage and a despicable procedure to force a disarmed people to

give up those of her sons who, in war, had fought her battles. Of course, it would be foolish to deduct from this that the Anglo-Saxon world would also have understood our point of view if we had refused to pay indemnities or attempted to resist other dictates of opponents who were still under the spell of a protracted war psychosis.

Years were squandered in negotiating for the definite amount of war indemnities to be imposed upon Germany. It would take up far too much space if I were to discuss, in detail, each and every one of the twenty-seven conferences called during those years. Every conference seemed to us to be the very one to render a definite decision. Time and time again, we members of the government and party leaders would crowd around the telephone at the Chancellor's office, hope against hope in our hearts, but always comprehensive that that particular conference might mean the end of everything.

When, in 1928, I again accepted a portfolio, I was greatly surprised to discover how changed, by that time, was the reaction among the German people as a whole, and members of parliament and the government in particular, in regard to pending negotiations with former opponents. Formerly, there had been continuous excitement, daily reports, an everlasting exchange back and forth, a never-ending feel-

ing that the men delegated to the conference—although instructed in infinitesimal detail—should again and again be reminded of this or that. The delegates could never free themselves from the idea that they should remain in the closest possible touch with home and that they should never assume responsibility for any decision of which people and government would disapprove, although the dictates of the conference be inescapable.

Now, in 1928, whenever we faced a conference, it was with the assured belief that we could afford to wait if developments were not in accordance with our expectations. The unsuccessful termination of such deliberations no longer meant a new Ruhr invasion or the confiscation of customs receipts, nor yet the imposition of export duties or outrageous new "sanctions." It is here that the greatest progress, since those dark days directly following the War, becomes apparent. Nevertheless, if we had not utilized that particular juncture in our destiny to gain time, if we had not at first accepted the unbearable burden imposed upon us, if with mulish obstinacy we had resisted from the very start, yielding only to stark force, we would still be lingering on the most excruciating stretch of our political Road to Calvary.

During those years, however, the politics of

the government even within the very ranks of the German people met with a deplorable and far-reaching lack of understanding. Patriotism, especially among the young, was deflected and misused. The general wrath was aimed not so much at the opponents who still insisted upon kicking a man while he was down, but against their own government whose sad duty it was to act the rôle of a scapegoat for the people. Plots, conspiracies and assassinations were the order of the day. In the very hour when Germany was face to face with a most difficult foreign situation, her people were engaged in internal strife.

The only consolation, during that time, was the plebiscites held in the contested provinces, settling the question whether they were to remain with the *Reich* or not. Wherever the vote was taken, be it against the Poles, the Jugo-Slavs or the Danes, everybody who spoke the German mother tongue avowed allegiance to the Fatherland. Better still, people neither of German race nor of German tongue but who, for centuries, had maintained close contact with German culture, professed fealty to the *Reich.*

Reparation negotiations did not yet yield definite results. The so-called Boulogne Agreement of June 22, 1920, stipulated five annual payments of three billion goldmark each, five more annual payments of six billion goldmark

each, and finally thirty-two additional annual payments of seven billion goldmark each, altogether assessing the huge sum of two hundred and sixty-nine billion goldmark or, translated into current values, about ninety million goldmark.

When, in December, 1920, a commission of experts deliberated at Brussels, five annual payments of three billion goldmark each were suggested, with the proviso that the stipulation of a definite amount was to be left to the Reparation Commission proper. On the basis of this preliminary work, the Paris Conference, in January, 1921, arrived at the conclusion that Germany was to pay two series of forty-two annuities, one in fixed amounts totaling about two hundred and sixteen billion goldmark, and a second variable one, consisting of a twelve per cent levy on annual German exports.

At the Paris Conference, negotiations were carried on with Germany directly for the first time. In March, 1921, at the London Conference, Germany made so bold as to present an offer which, including payments already made at that time, amounted to approximately fifty billion goldmark. As the opponents demanded more, the conference came to an untimely end. Dr. Walther Simons, representative of Germany, was greeted like a hero on his return to the Fatherland. But all this did not prevent

our opponents soon thereafter from occupying Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort, at the same time threatening to invade the Ruhr if Germany refused to accept their demands within a short time. Next came the acceptance of the London ultimatum by the *Reichstag* in May, 1921. Dr. Gustav Stresemann, when dealing with the leaders of the left parties, as well as in conversation with Lord D'Abernon, hinted that Germany recognized the necessity of yielding to force. Nevertheless, he stood ready to accept the responsibility, provided he was given sufficient time and status to continue the pending negotiations with a view to obtaining more tangible results. The German People's Party, however, did not see their way clear to make concessions and left the government. Next, the Socialists entered the Cabinet. Konstantin Fehrenbach resigned and the Wirth Cabinet, a pronounced government of the left, took the helm. The German monthly payments commenced.

Germany suffered another setback in October, 1921, when Upper Silesia was dismembered in a way not at all in agreement with the result of the plebiscite which had been overwhelmingly in our favor. This decision was a severe defeat of English politics. At that time, under the premiership of Lloyd George, the British

had already arrived at a point where it was understood that, politically as well as economically, it was a fallacy to deprive Germany of Upper Silesia. The history of those years proves the unmistakable lesson that England never stood ready to risk a break with France just to please Germany.

The first tangible rapprochement was the Rathenau-Loucheur agreement, concluded at a meeting in Wiesbaden on October 6, 1921. This agreement constitutes the first attempt to steer the reparation question away from political grounds towards the field of economics and to solve the dilemma, at least in part, by deliveries in kind. After this, there was a conference at Cannes in January, 1922, when for the first time collective European reason came very near victory. It was Rathenau who, at this congress, led the German delegation with great authority. When, in the course of his final speech, Rathenau emphatically demanded a real peace for Germany, unanimous applause proved that world opinion was gradually coming around in favor of Germany. Aristide Briand, however, who headed the French delegation, did not succeed in inducing the Chamber of Deputies to support his policies. Briand had to resign under pressure from Poincaré and the conference came to an end.

In April and May, 1922, there followed the

World Economic Conference at Geneva to which Poincaré had given his assent only under the condition that merely questions of international economics would be aired but that, under no circumstances, would reparation problems be touched upon. Accordingly, this conference broke up without yielding tangible results. Nevertheless, there was one glimmer of hope left for the discouraged Germans: the Rapallo Treaty with Russia of April 16th. This meeting was the first since the War where Russian delegates attended a European conference by invitation. The treaty was primarily a so-called amity agreement; it seemed important, inasmuch as it contained a most-favored-nation clause. However, it was still more important for the reason that, by this treaty, the impression was created for the first time that Germany could indulge in some policy other than just one of complaisance. The treaty was not unlike a danger signal directed towards the west. The meaning of this signal was apparently understood there since it produced results.

After the fruitless conclusion of the Cannes Conference, the second half of 1922 was completely wasted as nobody seemed to know what to do. To make matters worse, Germany, by the hand of fanatics, lost in Rathenau one of her few men who combined an ingrained feeling

for national necessities with a thorough understanding of international conditions. Rathenau's assassination reopened terrific internal strife. On November 22, 1922, the Cuno Government was formed. Dr. Wilhelm Cuno, in view of the growing depreciation of German currency, proposed a moratorium to the opponents. He also suggested the organization of an international combine to support the mark. He tried to make this suggestion more inviting by proposing, via Washington, a peace assurance to France for the duration of thirty years —a step whose psychological tendency will always remain completely obscure to me. As it appears to me, France is not worried about her security during the next twenty or thirty years, but rather concentrates her attention upon the time when Germany, internally strengthened, might, perhaps, see a chance to proceed against France in alliance with Russia. Cuno's offer was declined. France also turned down suggestions for the settlement of the reparation question submitted to her by England. At that particular moment, a peaceful solution seemed impossible. More and more, the impression gained ground that Poincaré was planning a decisive and forcible stroke.

The Ruhr Invasion and Its Results

In January, 1923, while important economic negotiations were still pending, France and Belgium decided to employ force against Germany under the pretext that Germany had not completely fulfilled stipulated deliveries in kind. French and Belgium soldiers invaded the Ruhr region.

At first, this incident was not referred to as an actual invasion but, in view of England's opposition, rather spoken of as the employment of an engineering commission in order to obtain tangible guarantees. But it did not take long before this engineering commission revealed itself as an army of occupation. There was nobody in Germany who did not condemn this obvious injustice. Passive resistance commenced, ushering in a period of the most acute political and economic distress Germany ever experienced.

During those months, the opinion was prevalent in Germany that passive resistance could be successfully employed as a means of ejecting the French military from the Ruhr. Such a viewpoint is an over-estimation of the pacific idea; perhaps even an over-estimation of the trade-union idea. When, by order of the Chancellor, during the early stages of passive resistance, I visited the Ruhr and Rhineland in

order to acquaint myself with the prevailing sentiment, I rendered a report which I summed up as follows: "Passive resistance is not politics, but only the basis for such."

It seemed impossible to persist in passive resistance permanently. Speaking to a well-informed prelate in the Rhineland at that time, I was told: "We Catholics know, from the history of our Church, that martyrdom is able to resist the most excruciating torture for some time, but it will succumb to protracted brutalities. We also know that the virtues of martyrdom thrive only in the individual. As far as whole nations are concerned, those who despair or look for private gain will gradually infect the others, bravely resolved though they may be to sacrifice themselves."

This theory proved correct. There were tremendous sacrifices in wealth and blood and liberty. Although the resistance of the populace was heroic, stark reality gradually gained the upper hand. Doles, depleting the *Reich's* coffers, grew to gigantic proportions. Whatever values the country possessed or imported were confiscated by the French. While all the income of the country belonged to the French, the maintenance of officials and individuals who had lost their all depended on the German Government. Writhing under the claw of the

conqueror, Germany seemed likely to bleed to death.

For the longest time, it proved unavailing to propagate and prove my theory that passive resistance could at best furnish only a basis for a policy. Chancellor Cuno, on a trip of inspection of the occupied territory, was jubilantly received, not unlike a hero. Cuno opined that passive resistance would prove a means of successful defense. Doctor von Rosenberg, at that time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, attempted to enlist the interest of England and America in favor of Germany. Time and again, he declared: "Just give me another week or ten days and England and the United States will intervene." But here again, it became apparent that neither England nor the United States would resort to arms, not even to threats, in order to assist Germany. The aversion of the Anglo-Saxon nations to advance too boldly from out of the ranks of their coalition, proved even stronger than their humane and judicial contemplations. So far as the Americans were concerned, they were already tired of all things European; England, on the other hand, considered herself too exposed to risk interference. The suggestion to attempt a direct understanding with France was turned down by Cuno and Rosenberg, in spite of the fact that there was a growing tendency in France to bring the

apparently interminable Ruhr imbroglio to a speedy conclusion. The power of the peacefully inclined opposition of the French left parties to Poincaré's policy seemed to wax stronger all the time. Even though, during the last few weeks, passive resistance gradually decreased, France was neither defeated nor, at any time, intimidated by intervention threats of a third party.

It redounds to Stresemann's immortal glory that he was quick in cleverly exploiting this state of affairs, as soon as he had downed the Cuno Government and taken a hand himself. If, at that time, passive resistance had been terminated completely or if it had been permitted to wear itself out, it could never have constituted an asset to trade on in the ensuing negotiations with France. Just at the right moment, Stresemann proposed peace to France. France could not ignore his offer without incurring the criticism of the whole world to an extent that sooner or later might prove dangerous to her. Courageous conviction and unflinching resolution were needed for making such a move as Stresemann's, as it only too easily invited a wrong interpretation of the reasons that motivated it. Only a man like Stresemann, member of a party whose nationalistic tendencies had never been doubted, was in a position to embark upon so unpopular a

course without being branded—and not only by fanatics—a traitor. If ever a member of one of the left parties—those parties which for years and years were carrying on unpopular policies—had dared to undertake that step, a storm of national resentment would have descended upon him.

There were more hard times still in store for Germany after passive resistance had been abandoned. There was the Hitler *putsch* in Munich and, prodded on by France, a renewal of the activities of the Separatists in the Rhineland. By this time France had clearly perceived that it would be impossible for her to retain a foothold for any length of time in Western Germany. It was for this reason that, in instigating Separatists' activities, France made the last attempt to realize her imperialistic plans. Even in German governmental circles, the opinion was voiced that, in view of the decline of German currency, it might prove impossible to hold on to the Rhineland and to the Ruhr region. Both demanded tremendous financial sacrifices without yielding any profits in return. The idea was aired of renouncing the Rhineland for the time being, in this way burdening France with all the responsibilities involved. Fortunately, this idea was not translated into actuality. Although such a plan might have been more than just a bubble, it did

not take into consideration certain imponderables. It is fortunate that it was abandoned by the government and the government parties. There is no telling whether a secession of the Rhineland would really have been only temporary.

The situation became still more aggravated because Poincaré refused all negotiations with the German Government regarding the resumption of work and the establishment of a semblance of political amity. It was left to commercial organization to negotiate with the Allies regarding the resumption of activities and to undertake the delivery of extensive payments in coal in order to be permitted to employ the workers. All this became part of the so-called Micum* agreements, of November, 1923. It would be utterly wrong, on the basis of these agreements, to denounce the German industrialists as traitors. They simply had to conclude these agreements to keep starvation from the doorstep of their workers and in order to protect that part of the national wealth which was invested in their enterprises. At any rate, it was advantageous in the interest of inner political understanding, that even the industrialists—who up to then had fought the policy of fulfilment with so much fervor—had to admit that without far-reaching complaisance, it

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would prove impossible to deal successfully with the brutal opponents. Months and months of anxiety and disgust passed, while an unresponsive French policy marked time. Then, at last, Stresemann's policy yielded results. There were months during which the parties of the right abstained from opposition, as was usually the case when enemy pressure was severe. Only much later, after this pressure had lifted, the opposition of the right set up a great hue and cry about treason.

Slowly, the situation improved, at first so far as currency was concerned. Although on December 15, 1923, the dollar was still worth four billion papermarks, it nevertheless proved possible to establish the Rentenmark, and by Draconian and highly unpopular economic measures, for which Doctor Luther assumed the responsibility, to maintain the value of the new currency. Now England came forward with the suggestion of creating a commission of experts to take charge of the reparation problem. France found no pretext to decline. Economic negotiations, which looked promising, commenced. They were the more promising as Poincaré's government in the new French elections had lost one hundred and twenty seats. For some time, the French radicals, under the leadership of Herriot, took the helm. Nevertheless, the main result, in view of the lacking

solidarity and aimlessness of the left parties, in the long run amounted to nothing more than impressing Poincaré with the fact that the Chamber of Deputies would decline a future repetition of his Ruhr policy. Almost simultaneously with these developments in France, England came under the sway of a Labour Government, headed by Ramsay MacDonald. This Labour Government proved more active and less prejudiced in matters of European peace than the Conservatives.

Striking the balance of the Ruhr incident, in view of all the hindsight professed by later critics, it must be stated that the French procedure was so sudden, so outrageous and so humiliating, that even within the ranks of communistic workers nobody dared to deny the necessity of resistance. But it must also be stated that Germany would have hurled herself into an abyss, had she not summed up a sufficiently strong resolution to terminate the Ruhr imbroglio.

As the Ruhr incident came to a close at just the right moment, it cannot be said that the experience proved a total loss. True enough, by the invasion of the Ruhr, Germany was rushed to the very edge of an abyss. Her currency was destroyed, filling her populace with a bitterness that in many instances survives to the present day. The confidence of the people in Ger-

many's ability to resist, and their belief in the victory of right, were gravely shaken. Eagerness to snatch subsidies proved detrimental. The necessity for the government of taking secret measures financed by secret funds, played havoc with the scheme of fiscal order, forcing the bureaucracy to resort to new and dangerous methods. So far as economic results were concerned, the Ruhr Invasion proved almost as disastrous to Germany's existence as the outcome of the World War—especially as the Ruhr War was directed against a people utterly spent and prone to regard each and every authority with suspicion.

Nevertheless, Germany was not the only nation defeated in the Ruhr War. France, too, was taught a severe lesson in broad view of the whole world. She was forced to abandon a policy which never would have proved successful. France had to learn that times are past when victors in war enrich themselves by greedily seizing gold and goods, cattle and captives. France came to understand that German assets are invested in enterprises which represent values only so long as a populace, willing and able to work, stands ready to exploit these enterprises. It is not so easy any more to collect war indemnities in a modern state. It needs more than simply attaching "productive guarantees." To work out a problem of in-

demnities, it is necessary to secure the coöperation of the vanquished. Without such cooperation, it is possible only to destroy values.

France, furthermore, as a result of the Ruhr War, had to denounce her intentions of annexing the Rhineland. How very German the Rhineland really is was driven home to her convincingly. The higher the culture of a people, the more closely connected in spirit it is with its native country. It is necessary only to cast a fleeting glance upon the people who inhabit the left bank of the Rhine. There is not one among them who does not enjoy spiritual and economic relations with the Germany that stretches to the right of the Rhine. This sentiment explains the stubborn resistance any attempt at annexation of the Rhineland would meet. It is not necessarily the highest spiritual values that furnish the link of unwavering loyalty. In a people like the Germans, who indulge in little, but by no means meaningless hobbies, even lesser spiritual values will tie the knot of national brotherhood. I shall never forget when, during my visit to the Rhineland, the chairman of a society of rabbit breeders explained to me his most important reason for joining the ranks of the resisters was that he considered himself one of the leading members of the German national organization of rabbit breeders.

In addition to this, the Germans, as a people, are ambitious to see their children reach a higher rung on the social ladder than themselves. The Slovakian woodchopper, who does not intend his son to be anything better than a woodchopper, may be perfectly satisfied under the sway of any government, as long as this government provides for his physical needs. For the German, separation from the Fatherland means destruction of all the hopes he entertained for his children's future.

In the course of the Ruhr War, it became manifest to the French that all their brutal and propagandistic activities in regard to the annexation of the Rhineland were unavailing. Thus, for the time being, they have given up this fond dream. Besides, France became convinced that brutal aggression on her part served only to isolate her politically, at the same time branding her, not Germany, as the disturber of the European peace. Neither politically nor financially is France independent enough to regard lightly the opinion that the world entertains of her; she would never long be able to sustain isolation. She knows that the United States especially is desirous that France should regain her economic strength by peaceful means, in order to pay her debts, and not stalk dangerous adventures. For France, the balance of the Ruhr War consisted in the lesson

that she came clearly to understand her limitations. The victory she gained was a Pyrrhic victory, a feat she will hesitate to repeat. The Ruhr War was the last of the great thunderstorms that have swept over Europe since 1914. It has cleared the air more than all the others.

The Dawes Plan

Economic deliberations, in which America at last joined, culminated in the formulation of the Dawes Plan in August, 1924. The Dawes Plan took the reparation question out of politics. Economic experts built up the Dawes Plan on an economic basis. The burdens which it imposed upon Germany were gigantic. The initial burden of one thousand million goldmark, already, as early as September 1, 1928, reached the limit of two thousand five hundred million goldmark. Railroads were handed over as collateral, and other enterprises mortgaged. The administration of the railroads and that of the *Reichsbank* was, to fifty per cent, taken out of German hands. In view of these facts, one could almost speak of a partial loss of German sovereignty. An American, S. Parker Gilbert, as Agent General for Reparations Payments, became the financial master of Germany and almost of Europe as a whole. On the other hand,

the progress induced by the Dawes Plan was tremendous. The so-called Transfer Clause of the plan prevented payments to foreign countries from causing a new depreciation of German currency.

There has been discussion whether this clause ever could be put into practice. Only recently, the opinion was advanced that it could be employed only if Germany faced complete financial ruin. Germany's ability to pay, even after an economic decline, could be maintained for a good long while by raising the rate of interest, in order to support the value of German currency. Raising the rate of interest, however, would make it impossible for German industry to compete successfully. Germany's industries would be strangled, unemployment would gain, and revolts become the order of the day.

I concur with these arguments. But nevertheless, the Transfer Clause, at that particular juncture, was not superfluous. At a time when Germany's public and private economic conditions were considered unsafe on account of the inflation which had hardly passed, the clause served to support, within the boundaries of Germany and in foreign countries, the stability of the German mark and Germany's right to obtain credit.

The Dawes Plan also stipulated that Germany, aside from payments already imposed

upon her, should not be called upon to discharge additional obligations. This cleared away the state of insecurity which troubled Germany in view of the possibility that suddenly new demands would be presented to her. Especially in the Rhineland, the ever-present eagerness on the part of the armies of occupation to charge each and every item of expense to the German account was in this way forestalled. Furthermore, the plan definitely provided that traffic within Germany should not be subjected to any limitations, removing especially the intolerable customs frontier created along the Rhine during the Ruhr War.

Moreover, the evacuation of the Ruhr was stipulated. Of course, the fact that a full year was allowed for this evacuation was a painful concession to French prestige. Nevertheless, it did not interfere very greatly with the general satisfaction over the definite termination of the French outrage. Paramount, however, was that the Dawes Plan inhibited a repetition of sanctions by any single one of our former opponents. In future, sanctions were permissible only in such cases where the Reparations Commission unanimously decided that Germany had evaded her obligations or in case an arbitration commission rendered such a decision. Such an arbitration commission was to be elected by unanimous vote by the Reparation

Commission. If no unanimous vote could be obtained, it was left to the World Court in The Hague to select such a commission for a term of five years. In this way, aspirations of France to decide Germany's fate arbitrarily were definitely blocked. In future, France had to submit to the scheme of established international order.

In spite of all doubts voiced by different parties, the Dawes Plan was accepted in the *Reichstag* by a two-thirds majority. Even the Nationalists did not dare to prevent the acceptance of the plan by opposing it *en bloc*. When the roll was called on the acceptance of the Dawes Plan, the Nationalists split up in two factions.

The Locarno Pact

Shortly after the acceptance of the Dawes Plan, the idea was advanced to supplement the financial understanding by a political meeting of minds. Two different courses were open for Germany. The one, to aim at an immediate entrance into the League; the other to establish political rapprochement by individual treaties with individual powers, especially with England and France. There was much in favor of entering the League of Nations without delay, and, by active coöperation, assisting in tranquilizing Europe. At the same time, this proce-

dure would enhance the importance of the League, making it plain that this body alone was competent to guard the peace of the world.

Stresemann chose the more circuitous route because it seemed safer to him. A contributing factor to this decision might have been the fact that a goodly part of Germany's populace was still disinclined to join the League. At any rate, Stresemann's course seemed propitious, perhaps even necessary, because France, too, leaned toward a plan of individual understanding. France has never rid herself entirely of worry for her safety since the protection, promised her by England and America through the pact of June 28, 1919, was rendered null and void through the refusal of the United States Senate to accept the proposal. There were apparently other negotiations pending between France and England, the object of which was to induce other European powers to guarantee France's safety. German foreign policy naturally interpreted all these efforts as aimed against the *Reich*. Nevertheless, Stresemann succeeded in establishing the necessary contact and eventually a date was set for the conference at Locarno.

Negotiations at Locarno, from October 5 to October 16, 1925, took a harmonious course and were commented upon publicly in glowing

phrases by the participating countries. A pact between Germany and France provided that neither one will disturb the *status quo* of the Rhine. Italy, Belgium and England assumed the parts of guarantors. Difficulties between Germany and France are no longer to be readjusted by force of arms, but are to be submitted, firstly, to an arbitrary commission in which neutral countries are to have the majority, then, to the League of Nations. This indicates appreciable progress for a disarmed Germany in comparison with a France armed to her teeth. But such a settlement of affairs in the West was unobtainable for Germany unless a pact concerning the East be made simultaneously. Such a pact, while not guaranteeing the frontiers in the East, provided for peaceful procedure in case of difficulties between Germany and Poland, thus avoiding the possibility of an armed conflict between these two nations. In view of Germany's unprotected situation, it is conceded to her that, contrary to a popular interpretation of Clause XVI of the covenant of the League of Nations, in case of a combined action of the powers her territory shall not be invaded for the purpose of organizing military actions against an offending member of the League unless Germany assents.

With the Locarno Pact, Germany once more

was recognized as a great power. In England and France, the Locarno Pact was looked upon as spelling the end of the Entente. The English press referred to the pact as the end of the Rhineland policy, inaugurated by Louis XIV of France.

All that this treaty needed for consummation was Germany's admission into the League of Nations, for which the high contracting parties promised to plead.

Germany Joins the League of Nations

The entrance of Germany into the League of Nations was delayed because, under the covenant of the League, South American powers enjoy the right to be heard even in problems which primarily concern Europe.

Meanwhile, in Berlin, on April 4, 1926, a new agreement was concluded with Russia in order to dispel her suspicion that Germany's joining the League contained anti-Russian motives.

On September 6, 1926, Germany joined the League and at the same time was given a permanent seat in the council, a condition made by the *Reich*. Germany was fortunate enough to secure for herself, right from the start, a respected position within the League. No trace now remained of prejudices formerly directed against her.

The Geneva Conference

The League of Nations, more representative than ever because of the entrance of Germany, felt the urge to take up far-flung and world-wide economic problems. Thus, in 1927, the World Economic Conference was called to Geneva. The delegates were charged not only to eliminate remnants of commercial war measures, but also to plan a sensible and well-organized scheme of world economics. At this conference, Germany declared her readiness to cooperate fully in obtaining the desired goal, but results of the conference remained problematical.

The Kellogg Pact

To most politicians, the League of Nations did not seem to offer sufficient security. Its administration proceeded almost too carefully lest the peace of the world be disturbed. Aside from insuring national safety, by way of membership in the League, more and more countries concluded individual arbitration, security, and disarmament treaties with their respective neighbors. Indeed, there exists a disconcerting number of treaties whose purpose is to maintain the peace of the world. Today there is hardly one country left which did not conclude at least one of these treaties at some time or another.

Nevertheless, even though Jugo-Slavia and Italy have concluded a pact, nobody is so deluded as to assume that by such measures relations between these peoples could be improved to any great extent. Somehow, I cannot help but look skeptically upon this overflow of treaty promises. I cannot free myself from the impression that thorough understanding among the nations, which could so easily be secured by an all-around amity between the countries under the auspices of the League, must needs suffer from a super-abundance of contractual friendship assertions. To conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements may belong to the highly developed art of diplomacy. However, really to know all the contents of all these agreements seems to be a job for filing clerks. Omnilateral agreements among the states seem far more important to me. Undoubtedly many of these post-War agreements look strangely similar to the alliances concluded before the War. When the War broke out, only some of these survived and it was due to them that more and more countries were brought into the cataclysm.

The Kellogg Pact of August 27, 1928, stands out in its significance as an omnilateral contract above all these numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements. While the covenant of the League of Nations still tolerates war as a politi-

cal policy after negotiations have come to naught, or in cases where the decision of the World Court in The Hague was disregarded, the Kellogg Pact aims at eliminating war altogether according to its actual wording. In reality, this meaning was diluted by the sundry and assorted notes with which the different nations accompanied the acceptance of the Pact. These notes show a decided tendency to claim the right of armed defensive actions—thus opening a back door to the pretexts of any aggressor. By no means do I depreciate the moral value of the Kellogg Pact. This instrument will undoubtedly result in America becoming seriously interested in the problem of European peace. By asseverations, it might also serve to intensify the love for peace so often expressed by the nations.

So far as the practical value of the Kellogg Pact is concerned, this appears somewhat problematical. Of course, it is possible to read an aggressor nation out of the community of all the other nations, but it is hardly ever possible to decide objectively and definitely upon the real aggressor. From the fact that, in the United States, the Kellogg Pact is interpreted to mean that a war resulting from an attack upon American property in foreign countries—this naturally refers to Central American conditions as in Mexico and Nicaragua—is to be

considered not as a war of aggression, but as a defense action, one may conclude that the Kellogg Pact is not exactly a signal success. A clever Englishman sometime ago declared: "If Alexander the Great were still alive and decided to attack Persia, he could sign the Kellogg Pact without any compunction, before entering upon that martial enterprise." Even the new formula, under which war as an instrument of national policies is renounced, is not much better. Above all, the Kellogg Pact fails to set up an authority to judge between right and wrong. It is not endowed with the power of executing sentences.

It seems to me that in view of all these problems, it is of utmost importance to strengthen the authority and the executive powers of the League of Nations. Up to now, the League of Nations has been satisfied simply to receive and file all these agreements. The League very carefully avoided, with a perspicacity which specially distinguished Sir Eric Drummond, its Secretary General, scrutinizing these treaties to determine whether or not they are in agreement with the covenant of the League.

It is gratifying to note, however, that on March 13, 1928, the League recommended to the member countries that it would be more important for them to comply with the so-called Option Clause of The Hague statute than to

conclude unilateral treaties. This is the correct step for the nations to take. Germany was the first of the great powers to accede to this demand. Thus, by expressing her readiness to submit her difficulties to international arbitration, she made a valuable contribution to the principle of right, whose application means her sole salvation. Only later, the English government followed suit, in this way inducing almost all the important members of the League to a similar procedure. The entire development denotes important progress.

So far as the practical application of the Kellogg Pact is concerned, appreciable improvement could be brought about if the suggestion, made by the English Labour Party at the League meeting in 1929, were acted upon. This suggestion, referred to a committee for a report, was that the covenant of the League of Nations be amended by prohibiting war altogether, such an agreement to be enforced by all the executive measures at the disposal of the League.

Disarmament

General disarmament may be expected to gain great impetus if by international agreements the security of individual nations should actually be enhanced. Under the Versailles

Treaty, we were forced to disarm, but the same treaty did not at all stipulate that Germany alone was to disarm. On the contrary, Germany's disarmament was intended to inaugurate general disarmament.

The most outstanding difficulty of disarmament is the problem whether the mode of procedure should be to establish security first or to begin by disarming the nations. Naturally, so long as nations dwell in insecurity, they will resist disarmament. Besides, insecurity in one particular part of Europe not only affects the armament plans of neighboring nations, but also those of nations situated in more distant regions. There is a vicious circle in continuous operation. If, for example, Russia exerts pressure on Roumania, Roumania, naturally, considers herself jeopardized and accelerates her armament plans. In turn, Roumanian armament reacts on Hungary, Hungary on Jugo-Slavia, Jugo-Slavia on Italy, and Italy on France. In this manner, the vicious circle is created, partly induced by political considerations, partly by the suggestions of ambitious military experts.

This, then, is the stumbling-block. For this reason, it is so exceedingly difficult for the disarmament question to make any headway; nor will it gain ground so long as the world at large is not satisfied as to the security of indi-

vidual nations. Especially France, always anticipating enemy attacks, assumes the point of view: first security and then disarmament. In view of all this, it is impossible to escape the conviction that the security of the world does not so much depend upon additional agreements recorded on paper, but rather upon the moral support of a general will to peace; and also upon the juridical strengthening of the League of Nations and the supra-national power it constitutes.

There are still other technical difficulties blocking the path to general disarmament. Nowadays, it is a real problem to correctly classify men trained and able to bear arms, and those employed in auxiliary services. It seems somewhat ludicrous that France insists upon counting pseudo-military organizations in Germany, while protesting that her own well-trained reserves do not belong in the same category. Moreover, military training all over the world is so very different, that it is next to impossible to fix a common basis for the evaluation of the rank and file of any individual country. Our own military experts did not prove of any special assistance in this question, particularly General von Seeckt, our former Minister of Defense. It was von Seeckt who, publicly and in his writings, reiterated that in our time a small army of professional soldiers is more

valuable than an all-embracing national army.

More difficult still is the matter of military strength, in view of what the French call *potential de guerre.* It is perfectly obvious that a country with a highly developed steel industry and machinery with which to produce weapons, or a country controlling a well-organized chemical industry, even after disarmament has become effective, is still in a much better position to rearm herself than strictly agrarian nations.

The abortive results of the Disarmament Conference may be explained on the basis of these enumerated difficulties. Germany, viewing the present stage of one-sided disarmament, considers this state of affairs another great injustice inflicted upon her; more than any other nation, she is interested in overcoming these difficulties. In this regard, Germany recognizes the valuable services rendered her in the course of sundry disarmament conferences, by the expert and decisive actions of Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, her former Ambassador to Washington.

That England's Labour Government delegated Lord Cecil to participate in the disarmament deliberations raised new hopes, although he was unsuccessful when he pleaded this cause before the forum of the League of Nations. It will be remembered that it was Lord Cecil who resigned once before because of the intransig-

ent position assumed in the disarmament question by the English Conservative Government. So far as total disarmament of England is concerned, regardless of the state of armament of the rest of the world, this was opposed in the face of the radical wing of the Labour Party by her Foreign Minister Henderson at the Party Congress in October, 1929. The Labourites based this opposition on exactly the same grounds as Germany.

In reference to naval disarmament, France, time and again, proved herself a serious obstacle, in this way interfering with a definite understanding between the United States and England. The chief issue for France is her desire to obtain a security agreement, under which other powers guarantee the maintenance of France's present status. Aside from this, the imperialism of Italy worries France greatly. The ambition of this over-populated country for expansion in Tunis was one of the main reasons which induced France to assume a policy antagonistic to progress at the recent London Naval Conference.

The Young Plan

The Dawes Plan assuredly was a great step forward. Nevertheless, under this plan, Germany was still subjected to foreign initiative

and foreign power. Despite the conferences between Stresemann and Briand at Thiory, Germany, contrary to the understanding meanwhile arrived at with France, had still to submit to a continuation of the Rhineland occupation. Moreover, Germany was forced to give financial guarantees and submit to a control of her revenues—two concessions inimical to her sovereignty. Further, there was the ever-present worry whether the payments provided for in the Dawes Plan would not prove too much for Germany to fulfill. It was self-evident that Germany would eventually try to improve all these conditions. Even her former enemies gradually came to admit that it would not be possible, in the long run, for Germany to live up to all the stipulations of the Dawes Plan. The American Agent General for Reparation Payments, S. Parker Gilbert, supported this opinion in the capitals of the opponents. To be sure, it seems that he painted too rosy a picture of Germany's efficiency, her economic conditions and her propensities in order to gain his point by persuasion.

It is easy to question whether the time for new negotiations was chosen with much perspicacity. At any rate, in the spring of 1929, there assembled in Paris a conference of experts, with Germany represented by the President of the *Reichsbank,* Dr. Hjalmar Schacht.

The negotiations dragged out for months, until finally the experts of America, the other creditor nations and Germany arrived at the so-called Young Plan. On this new plan was based the ensuing conference in The Hague of January, 1930. A previous conference in The Hague, in August, 1929, had wound up with a basic agreement and now the second conference in January, 1930, culminated in a definite acceptance of the plan's outlines. The result of all this is the evacuation of the Rhineland and the renunciation of all stipulations which interfered with German sovereignty, such as the control of the *Reichsbank* and of railroad revenues. Besides, the Transfer Clause was abrogated and German payments reduced. Differences arising over occupied territory, from now on, are to be settled by the commission especially appointed for this purpose under the Locarno Pact. All controls vested previously in the hands of the Agent General for Reparation Payments, the Transfer Commission, the Commissioner for Revenues, the Commissioner for Railroads, the *Reichsbank* Commissioner and others, are delegated to the new Bank for International Settlements, the so-called Reparation Bank, in which organization Germany enjoys a position of equality.

Under the Young Plan, Germany is guarded against sanctions in every possible way. The

right to enforce such sanctions—for example the reoccupation of the Rhineland in order to satisfy real or imaginary demands resulting from the agreement—was not only taken out of the hands of individual creditor states, but also out of the hands of the creditor nations as a whole. In this way, conditions as they existed before and even after the Locarno Pact were greatly improved. Measures were provided for that completely Utopian case that the German Government should ever refuse to fulfill the Young Plan. These measures, by way of a prescribed procedure, are referred from the Bank for International Settlement, to The Hague Tribunal. Only after The Hague Tribunal decides that Germany has given definite evidence of being resolved to tear up the Young Plan are the individual creditor states permitted to proceed against her, under this plan. Germany is also given the option to discontinue payments in foreign currencies in case she is apprehensive of jeopardizing her own *valuta*. After a year's time, Germany may even discontinue payments in her own currency in order to alleviate too great a strain on her very existence. Germany, naturally, has not the slightest intention of availing herself of this right in an unreasonable manner, because in such a case, the advisory council of the Bank for International Settlements will be called

upon to render a decision, and Germany certainly cannot afford to incur any verdict inimical to her standing. After a two years' moratorium, Germany must clear herself of her debts in methods and manners laid down by a special advisory commission. At any rate, according to The Hague agreement, Germany, in an hour of danger, has at least the right to make her own decisions as to the continuation of payments. Germany need no longer depend on a foreign reparation agent who might take an entirely different slant on German necessities than the viewpoint assumed by German economists and politicians.

To be sure, payments as imposed upon Germany under the Young Plan, may be considered too heavy. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the Young Plan, in comparison with the Dawes Plan, is a great improvement, especially if the Young Plan payments are contrasted with those forced upon Germany prior to the Dawes Plan. The fact that Germany is no longer impeded in the exercise of her rights of sovereignty must be considered a tremendous advantage. The liberation of the Rhineland fills the German people with a joy that cannot be dampened even by the heavy material worries that hover over the nation. To speak about the liberation of the Rhineland only four or five years ago meant to invite the jeers and

the scorn of the members of the Right parties. The liberation of the Rhineland means so much to Germany, as it signifies the definite abortion of all the ambitious plans in which France indulged during the last centuries in her schemings for the Rhineland.

But in spite of all that, even under greatly improved conditions, Germany is still steeped in great worries. There is concern about the abolition of the Transfer Clause, although this clause, under present-day conditions, must be considered almost obsolete. Of course, it is sheer fallacy on the part of the Right press to insist that any crisis brought about by the Dawes Plan would have lasted only a short time, later resulting in a turn for the better. On the other hand, the Right insists that the introduction of the Young Plan ushers in a chronic crisis. To be sure, there is no convincing proof for the one opinion or for the other. Personally, I hold that a quickly developing crisis under the Dawes Plan would have caused an inflation, and it is an established fact that such a crisis hardly ever forebodes financial convalescence. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that a Dawes crisis would have been greatly influenced in its development by the position taken by the Agent General for Reparation Payments. How dangerous a foreign point of view may become in such a crisis, is strikingly

illustrated by what took place around the end of April, 1929. It was at that time that the value of the German mark was seriously jeopardized by French financial attacks, instigated under the assumption of forcing Germany to accept the French programme for payments. Then and there, despite the precarious position of the mark, the Agent General for Reparation Payments continued to buy up German currency. All this proves what a great advantage it is to Germany to make independent decisions in regard to the stoppage of payments as provided under The Hague agreement.

I do not share the skepticism, manifested in certain circles, about questions pertaining to the Rhineland being submitted to a Locarno commission. The French publicist, Pertinax, writing about this matter from the point of view of a chauvinistic Frenchman, declared that of the *commission de constatation* only the "shadow of a shadow" remains today. It seems only logical that no objection should be raised to the provision which refers matters of dispute to the Locarno Commission. Under the Locarno Pact, all difficulties ever arising between Germany and France are to be submitted to this Commission. This concession, at the time of the conclusion of the Pact, was considered a great achievement, inasmuch as it

meant that even a France, armed to her very teeth, would have to accept the decision of the Commission. I cannot see any reason why a different point of view should be taken now, regarding an analagous provision. There is no doubt that if, at the time of the Locarno Pact, the status of the Rhineland had been what it now is, controversial matters would have been made subject to this same arbitration agreement.

The possibility, so often mentioned recently, that investigations of the arbitration board may be carried to German soil exists not only in matters connected with the Rhineland, but in every contest. Whosoever objects to such possibilities declares himself in principle against arbitration and for a bloody settling of matters of dispute. There is also nothing disturbing in the stipulation that the creditor nations regain their freedom of action whenever The Hague Tribunal decides that Germany has willfully torn up the Young Plan. German politics would surely be in a sorry plight should they ever permit a state of affairs which would force an impartial Hague Tribunal to render such a verdict. The decision as to what means are actually available, in case The Hague decides against Germany and for the creditor nations, rests with the League of Nations and is also to be based upon the Kellogg Pact. The more

these two instruments serve to furnish means for the peaceful settlement of disputed matters, the more the danger of wars is forestalled. On the basis of conditions as they now exist, neither a war with Germany nor a reoccupation of the Rhineland, as a means of collecting reparations, any longer seems feasible. M. Tardieu, speaking in the French Chamber of Deputies, recently made the distinct statement that Article 430 of the Versailles Treaty cannot longer be considered in force.

However, inasmuch as nobody can foresee today whether Germany will be able to meet her obligations under the Young Plan, there is still reason for concern. The amount of the payments was fixed, not on the basis of economic assets, but rather from the point of view of political considerations. This became especially clear from Mr. Owen D. Young's own words to the effect that Germany's obligations were simply to be based on the amount of debts incurred by America's former allies, including a fifty per cent addition. It is important that these obligations have not assumed a commercial character; they are still mainly political obligations. For a reduction of these obligations Germany, under Article XIX of the covenant of the League of Nations, may appeal to Geneva, asserting that these obligations, being unbearable, are inimical to peace. Nevertheless,

it is utterly wrong to reiterate the demand for, and the possibility of, a revision. This revision will come all by itself, provided Germany does not protest unceasingly, but rather tries her utmost to discharge her obligations until she is obviously unable to do so. Whether and when this may happen, depends on future economic developments and, still more, on the gold situation of the world—a matter to be decided by the able experts of the Bank for International Settlements.

It is painful that, in regard to the Saar, no decision is made so far. It always was, and it remains, the inherent mistake of French policy that Paris will never make a concession when such a concession would create the greatest possible psychological effect. Another painful experience was the inability to establish at The Hague the inviolability of private property by a decision in favor of the restitution of all confiscated German property. If other powers had emulated America's example, returning alien property, a valuable principle in international relations would have been revived. However, Belgium, France and Italy followed the example set by America only to a very limited degree. England did even less than the other powers, and of her dominions, only Canada displays a degree of willingness. Great Britain's old position as the world's banker

should have induced her to recognize this principle. The attitude of the Labour Government at The Hague surely proved a disappointment for Germany.

Although it is possible to raise doubts regarding the feasibility of the Young Plan as a whole, there can be no question but that it makes for a greater general stability than did the Dawes Plan. The liberation of the Rhineland has relieved the German people from a nightmare. Now Germany can pay undivided attention to a rehabilitation of her economics and her finances. If guided correctly, Germany will quickly regain the confidence of the rest of the world in her ability to fulfill financial obligations. Cheap money is even more important for German economics than a reduction of taxes. Besides, the improvement of conditions in the West gives German foreign politics the chance to pay more attention to the intolerable conditions in the East. Aside from that, German foreign politics will be able to apply itself to the solution of the minority problems, and to the *Anschluss* with German Austria.

The results of The Hague Conference may be considered from three different points of view. The opinions of the delegates may be criticized, as may their political orientation and even their diplomatic dexterity. Any doubt in

the nationalistic orientation of the delegates—all members of western powers—may be dismissed right away. The political atmosphere in Germany will not be completely cleared until the German comes to understand that a nationalistic orientation is to be assumed as a matter of course in all things political, even in the opponent. Anybody who acts differently is liable to make a very sad spectacle of himself as did Alfred Hugenberg and his followers. They tried to create an impossible condition under which any man, delegated to act in matters of foreign politics, exposes himself to the danger of being thrown into prison. To influence foreign politics by plebiscites seems nonsensical because such a procedure entirely disregards the fact that foreign politics are not made onesidedly, but only in negotiations with other, and sometimes more powerful, governments.

If the general course of German foreign politics is studied under the microscope of criticism, the critic ought to answer the question what course, in his mind, seems feasible. If overnationalistically inclined societies* demand of a German government that it stop not only all further payments of reparations, but also present a bill of German demands to the opponents,

*Dr. Koch-Weser here refers to the *Alldeutscher Verband.*

then such societies should be invited to play the sheriff themselves in order to make the collections they suggest. Anybody, who after a lost war does not want to embark upon a new war, can do one thing only: adhere to a policy of understanding.

Finally, it is rather comfortable to doubt the diplomatic ability of delegates from the snug security of a cozy corner, but it is utterly impossible to prove any tangible lack of such abilities. After all, democracy does not mean distrust in leaders, but rather stands for implicit confidence. For the English, the main task of the voter is to be the "maker of the government." In such cases, where influential politicians criticize the cleverness of delegates, they should be invited to conduct the negotiations themselves. I am of the opinion that, considering those weaknesses to which man is always subject, every delegate does his duty the very best way he sees it. The Paris *Figaro* once printed a dispatch to the effect that each one of the delegates, be it Snowden or Stresemann, or anybody else, returned home with specific results with the exception of Briand who only harped on his muddled ideals of humanity, indulging in cosmopolitan platitudes. It is interesting to note here that this same criticism was voiced in the German Right press in regard to Stresemann.

In connection with the acceptance of the Young Plan, a temporary stabilization in Germany's relation to Poland has come about. In Germany, for the longest time, the opinion was prevalent that the Polish state would not prove lasting, in view of the limited political abilities of the Poles. Lack of political organization was moreover enhanced by Poland's absorption of about forty per cent of alien populations and by advancing her frontiers far beyond ethnographical lines of demarcation. For some time, the prevailing inclination was to refrain from any and all agreements which might serve to make things a little easier for the Poles. Former experiences of Germany with Poland seemed to support this point of view. However, it would have amounted to a wilful under-estimation of the opponent to persist any longer in a policy of waiting. An expert on Polish conditions, Professor Hoetzsch, speaking in the *Reichstag,* stated that Poland's existence must be considered secure for decades to come. One may agree with him, with reservations, perhaps, in view of internal unrest as it persists in Poland. In view of this state of affairs, it would be sheer irresponsibility not to attempt to reach an agreement with Poland on such questions as are of vital interest to the German people.

A thorough understanding of actual condi-

tions is the real reason underlying the recent agreements with Poland. So far as Germany is concerned, the main issue of the agreement is not the mutual renunciation of demands resulting from the liquidations of state or private properties. Most probably, Germany made greater sacrifices in this respect than did Poland. The real gain Germany derives from the agreement is the protection assured 12,000 German settlers and their descendants with regard to the security of their estates. Up to now the Polish Government, as the successor to the Prussian state in this region, claimed the right of acquiring these estates by way of administrative procedure. Germany simply owed it to the German farmers in Poland—and this I consider real patriotism—to obtain for them all the security possible for the maintenance of their property. Such a measure seems advisable not only in the interest of the German farmers in Poland, but also in the interest of any well-directed German East policy. All dreams and all talk about the reclamation of the Corridor, and a general revision of Germany's eastern boundaries, would come to naught had Germany just stood by while this human bridge, connecting the German homeland with cut-off East Prussia, was demolished. Even if the agreement is not all it should be,

it is valuable because it serves the best interests of Germany as a whole.

Subsequent to the Polish agreement, a commercial treaty was concluded. This was a necessity dictated by the best interests of the economically greatly reduced German provinces in the East. If they are ever expected to survive, neither isolated East Prussia, nor Silesia, penetrating wedge-like into the surrounding Slav country, should be handicapped in their economic relations with their political neighbors.

Looking Backward

There has been widespread doubt whether, during the first years of the War, Germany really had a foreign policy. However, anybody who studies the development of the last ten years and checks up on the results will soon be convinced that there actually was a German foreign policy. Of course, a foreign policy after a disastrous war can never be popular. A people like the Germans, hurled from the pinnacle of power to the depths of a debâcle—with all this implies—can only with difficulty adjust itself to a policy of evasion and submission, of temporizing and silence. Never, at such precarious times, can a policy be so lucid as to be clearly understandable right from the start; the most important part is that it be reason-

able. Both qualities frequently oppose each other. The unpopularity of a German foreign policy was intensified because it was carried on by the Government of the Republic which was, at that time, strongly disliked by a great number of people. A German Republic was generally looked upon by these people, steeped in monarchial traditions, as the mainspring of German weakness and the off-shoot of the Fatherland's defeat. There was not enough discernment to distinguish between cause and effect. Thus, time and again, the Republic was blamed as the source of the downfall.

Only gradually, the masses comprehended that it would have been a grave fallacy to block the way permanently to a possible renaissance of the German people by indulging in attempts at heroic politics. Only today have we come to understand that the real statesman of our time, if he really believes in the future of his people, does not look for honor by leading his country to an abyss of utter destruction, but rather by assisting his people to overcome and survive their difficulties.

Possibilities of a foreign policy for Germany were enhanced by the fact that the German people grew stronger morally, and recognized the true state of affairs. At the same time, war psychosis in general, and the overbearing behavior of the victors, subsided. The

firmer the stand of the German people, and the more hesitant the attacks of the opponents, the more resolutely we could fight for our right and maintain it without inviting the danger of being terrorized and destroyed. From all this, it becomes clear that it is incorrect to refer to the foreign policy, inaugurated by Stresemann, as swerving from the path of the policy of fulfilment. True, Stresemann's policies differed from those of Cuno. While the latter were just an abortive attempt at resistance, the former took up once more the policy of fulfilment. This course had not only been laid out, but also practically inaugurated by Rathenau, to whose everlasting memory this fact redounds. Stresemann's valuable services in the realm of foreign politics, in connection with the policy of fulfilment, culminated in his brave resolution putting an end to the disastrous Ruhr War policy, in the wise and unswerving manner in which he translated his ideas into action, and in his generally brilliant statecraft. To say that Stresemann's outstanding merit, in connection with his foreign policy, manifested itself in internal politics, does not imply that his personality as such should be under-estimated here. The very fact that he, belonging to a party of the Right, and coming from the camp of the critics of the policy of fulfilment, accepted this policy as his own, made him its de-

fender in the eyes of his people. Stresemann, with his impressive authority and his eloquence, succeeded in winning over those Germans who were nationalistically inclined and very difficult to convince of the necessities of practical policies. It really did not matter that his friends, in order to assist him, avoided speaking of a policy of fulfilment, but rather referred to it as "practical nationalistic politics." Today, the accepted term for Stresemann's policy is "Locarno policy" or the "policy of understanding."

It is incorrect to assume that a foreign policy as such is more important for a people than the creation of a thorough understanding for such a policy in the rank and file of the nation. It is necessary only to point out that Bismarck's politics would have been lost had he not possessed a marvelous aptness for popularizing his policies for the consumption of the masses. By winning over the public at large to his politics, Stresemann made it possible for Germany to practice this policy without suffering physically and spiritually. Although this policy in general, and in its aims, has remained the same, the attitude of the people toward it has undergone a change. So far as the parties of the left are concerned, this policy was accepted in the beginning only because there was nothing else to do. Each and every politician, with a clear

conception of facts, could perceive plainly that any other policies would hurt Germany severely without benefiting her in any way; be the arrogance of the opponents ever so unbearable, one had to submit to it. Even those who refused to recognize this fact before the Ruhr invasion, had to accept it then.

Today, however, it may be said that Germany adheres to this policy because she wants to. Even if we had weapons, we would not employ them in aggression against our former opponents because we have come to understand that Europe's future is definitely lost if she once again takes to arms which are likely to be more cruel and more poisonous than those employed during the four terrible years of the World War. Today, Germany once again is a great power, even though she may still be rather limited in some of her activities. The German people achieved this result through a policy of interminable patience and admirable common sense. Germany has made unquestionable progress during these last ten years. She regained the assurance of her life and her unity, participating auspiciously in a contest for her political and economic equality. Nobody has done more for this propitious development than that statesman whose loss we will always mourn: Gustav Stresemann.

Consistently and cleverly, never embarrassed

by the lack of understanding within the boundaries of the *Reich* and without, Stresemann energetically carried on his policy of good will. In the Fatherland—and what is still more important—in foreign countries, Stresemann has become the symbol of this very policy. The tremendous respect he commanded in foreign countries was brought home to me at Geneva. In the eyes of the foreigner, Stresemann was at once the representative of the new Germany and a good European. Although foreign countries took it for granted that Stresemann was primarily interested in the welfare of his own people, they also admitted that he had a thorough understanding of the views of the world and of European necessities. All this made Stresemann one of those leading statesmen of the world, whose task it is to find a new basis for the peaceful coöperation of the nations.

Stresemann liberated the Rhine. It was a tragic trick of fate that did not permit him to witness the *finale* of the occupation.

It is rather hard for a German patriot who still remembers the glory that was Germany's before the War to indulge in contemplations of this nature. Nevertheless, the very best of them eventually arrive at this point of view. Never before was this soul-tearing experience brought out more strikingly than in the statement issued by Germany's venerable President,

Paul von Hindenburg, upon the signing of the Young Plan. The very words with which the old leader in war and peace professed himself in sympathy with the Young Plan, shall be quoted here as a fitting conclusion of that part of this book that delves into the past. In his statement, President von Hindenburg said:

"In the course of the controversy for and against the acceptance of the Young Plan, I have received hundreds of letters from organizations, societies and individuals who, greatly apprehensive of the future of our Fatherland, prevailed upon me in moving words to prevent the consummation of the Young Plan by refusing to put my signature to the law of enactment and under the certificate of ratification. Inasmuch as it is impossible for me to take up the matter with all those who, either in short protests or in long statements addressed me, I desire to answer them here as follows:

"I signed the Young laws with heavy although stout heart after long and conscientious scrutiny. After listening to the supporters of the law as well as to the opponents, and after carefully considering the *pros* and *cons*, I arrived at the conclusion that, despite the heavy burden the new plan imposes upon the people for many years to come, and despite all the objections raised in regard to some of its features, the Young Plan, in comparison to the

Dawes Plan, constitutes an improvement and a relief, economically as well as politically, and signifies progress on the difficult road to Germany's liberation and reconstruction. Imbued with the feeling of responsibility which is imposed upon me in regard to Germany and her future, I could not bring myself to reject the plan, inasmuch as such a rejection would result in inestimable consequences for German economics and German finances, inducing severe crises for the Fatherland and all this implies. I am perfectly aware that even the acceptance of the Young Plan does not relieve us of all worries of the future; nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the road which we have chosen now, which grants occupied German territory fervently longed-for liberty and opens up for us the possibilities of further progress, will prove itself the right road.

"Many of the letters, in a spirit of well meaning, appealed to me personally not to becloud the memory of my name, as that of the former Field Marshal, in the light of history by putting it under the Young law. To this I reply: I have spent my life in that eminent school for performance of duty, the old army, where I learned always to do my duty to the Fatherland without thought of self. No consideration of my own person could be permitted to influence my decision. Even the thought to relieve

myself of this responsibility by a plebiscite or by resignation, could never be entertained by me.

"The political battle over the Young Plan, by promulgating the new law, has now come to an end. * * * * I seriously admonish all German men and women to remember their duty to their Fatherland and work together for the sake of our future which once more shall see a free and healthy and strong German people."

PART TWO

SCANNING THE FUTURE

CHAPTER IV

A GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY PLATFORM

A War or a Peace Policy?

Successful politics means suiting one's action to the needs and necessities of the moment, a fact that no foreign policy must ever overlook.

Scanning the political horizon, it seems difficult and dangerous to draw here more than just the bare outline of Germany's policies of the future. Nevertheless, it is feasible to shed some light upon leading questions. In the first place, it must be recognized that there can be no war policy for Germany. The whole development of the world aims at establishing peace, guaranteed by supra-national powers. Whether there will be more wars before we arrive at this happy consummation nobody knows. But practical politicians unanimously admit that a German war policy is utterly unthinkable. Time and again, Germany has been reminded that Turkey succeeded in discarding her original treaty with the Entente by a victorious war against Greece and by threatening the great powers with armed resistance. Tur-

key, however, is situated at the periphery of political life. She is almost invulnerable because no government of any European country could possibly mobilize an army sufficiently strong to fight a Turkish army of 500,000 men without being forced to give way. Moreover, the technical difficulties in landing an army on Turkish soil are still fresh in the memory of the world.

But how different is Germany's situation! Germany, with her open boundaries, right in the heart of Europe—a geographical position which has proved her undoing in a thousand years of history. Governments opposing Germany stand a good chance of gaining the assent of their peoples if they proposed to crush Germany permanently.

Not only instigating a war, but also participating in it, would spell disaster for Germany. There are certain cliques among us that owe allegiance to the policies of the Right which, for reasons of internal politics, long for dictatorship, combining with this desire the idea of an alliance-in-arms with Turkish, Hungarian, or Italian dictatorship. In a war of that kind, it would be Germany more than anybody else who would have to pay the bill. Germany should remain a nation competent to bear arms only in order to make it dangerous to force her into war, or to abuse her soil for a battlefield.

Towards the East or Towards the West?

There are differences of opinion in Germany as to whether Germany should orient herself towards the East or towards the West. The Germany of the future will remain what it has been up to now: the bridge between the East and the West. It was Bismarck's main endeavor to remain on good terms with the East without losing the friendship of the West, especially that of England. As long as Bismarck's well-tempered policies were observed in both directions, it proved possible to avoid a clean break with the one party or the other. Any policy less careful would have been forced to make a decision. When, after Bismarck's dismissal, Germany contested England's naval supremacy, and at the same time blocked Russia's way to the Bosphorus, the friendship with both was lost. All that was left for Germany, after these developments had taken place, was to look for assistance to Austro-Hungary. By that time, the Dual Monarchy was already far advanced on the road to deterioration.

There are all the reasons in the world for us to return once more to Bismarck's policy. Nevertheless, Germany must become neither England's mercenary in her battle against Bolshevism, nor Russia's accomplice against the Western powers. Germany must discover a

political formula which makes her a desirable partner for the one, as well as for the other. At any rate, it is impossible for Germany to indulge in politics of resistance towards the West by counting on Russian assistance. The Russia of today is not able to give much assistance. Even if Germany were to be drawn into a war between Russia and the Western powers, although in the case of Russian victory we might gain freedom towards the West, we would only be devoured and enslaved by Bolshevism.

Continental or Anglo-Saxon Policy?

During the last few years, German minds, time and again, have played with the idea of divorcing France from England and America and, together with the two Anglo-Saxon powers, embarking upon a policy directed against France. This, however, is a sad miscalculation. We are convinced by now that the United States has become Europe-shy. Nevertheless, in future, we may expect America to participate, albeit cautiously, in our financial liquidation with France—for the simple reason that America is interested in Europe's economic well-being. But we should not expect any more.

England, on the other hand, during the last

decade, has clearly proved that she will never break with France for the sake of Germany. In the course of the last few years, David Lloyd George has taken occasion to declare repeatedly that he was opposed to the terrible stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, but that he did not succeed in scoring his point, especially as he did not find sufficient support in his own country. If this be true, it would speak decidedly in favor of David Lloyd George. But it would be practically meaningless as far as our hopes in regard to England are concerned. England even in the case of the Upper Silesian plebiscite evaded the issue. Neither did she support us in our resistance during the Ruhr invasion. All that could ever be expected of England in case of such incidents of grave injustice as we might suffer is, at the most, a protest or an attempt at mediation, but never a decided stand in favor of German interests.

It appears clear enough that the England of the Labour Government is not so unswervingly attached to France as was the England of the Conservatives. There is an essential difference between Chamberlain's remark: "I love France like a wife," and the remarkable candor with which MacDonald, while in Paris, declared that the England of today stands ready to work hand in hand with all nations.

Only dreamers would expect the English

Labour Party to renounce the policy of national egotism. Of course, the Labour Party may adhere to this policy with less anxiety and more vision than the Conservatives. The Labour Party may be expected to entertain a far-sighted policy, recognizing the expediency for England—wherever the interests of England will permit such indulgence—of putting weak nations under her obligation. However, the Labour Government recedes from the pronounced equanimity of Chamberlain's policy, assiduously endeavoring to regain the reins of world politics. Snowden made himself popular in The Hague by opposing France and following his own English policy. The English people acclaimed him for this independence and not for the thirty to fifty million mark annually which he obtained for England by his procedure. The whole incident, by the way, at no time aimed at relieving Germany's financial burdens. As a matter of fact, as Germany had been excluded from the Conference, it was impossible for her to utilize England for her purposes. In the end, after it proved impossible for Snowden to obtain the millions from France, he accepted them from Germany. Although it had been anticipated that the change of government in England would induce a more liberal policy in Downing Street, there never was the slightest reason to expect that Eng-

land, for the sake of Germany and in opposition to France, would ever stand ready to make financial or blood sacrifices.

CHAPTER IV

THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN SITUATION

France and Germany

The most important and most necessary policy for Germany is one that will create understanding with France. Fortunately, resistance to such an understanding is not so strong in Germany now as before, because the France of today has abandoned the policy of humiliation with which she harassed Germany for years in order to bolster up her own prestige. Then, too, France has learned that attempts at brutally looting Germany's treasures are not likely to lead to financial success. On the other hand, it is not so necessary for Germany as it was before, to espouse a policy of understanding. After all, our policy of the last ten years makes it impossible for France to overtake Germany with war for the sake of settling economic differences. Of course, understanding with France is for Germany a consummation devoutly to be wished, especially at the present time, in order to clear away the last remnants from these years of oppression. In the long run, however, such a policy of

rapprochement is just as important for France herself because an understanding between the two nations will serve to enhance European cooperation and to brighten Europe's future.

Between Germany and France yawns a chasm of a thousand years' history, red with the blood spilled in armed combats almost beyond enumeration. It is for this reason that the two countries are generally considered arch enemies. However, one should not overlook the fact that this enmity between the countries is in reality nothing but a contest over some heritage. It is interesting to speculate how differently the book of history would read today if Louis IX—Saint Louis—had realized his plan for the division of his kingdom as he conceived it at first. If, for example, he had willed the old realm of the Franks and Lower Saxony—that is to say, in present-day geographical terminology, North Germany and Northern France—to one of his sons, and Bavaria, the South of France and Italy to the others. Only the realization of his later idea of dividing his kingdom incepted the German and the French nations.

Worst of all, between the two countries a third was wedged in, at first called Lorraine, and later Burgundy, a country much too small and helpless to have its own politics, but on the other hand valuable enough to become the objective of contesting policies on the part of

France and Germany. Since France became a united country, while Germany split up into small sovereignties, France in general was rather successful in this contest, although not always victorious. The Rhine policy of Ludwig XIV is inherently inspired by the testament of his namesake on the throne of France. However, neither one of the nations realized its goal. This dynastic contest is older, by many centuries, than national antagonism and the endeavor to create national states. Here are ideas which exerted an influence on the France of Joan of Arc. They became common property in France after the French revolution and in Germany after her subjugation by Napoleon I. Judged from the point of view of a national state, France, by the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, advanced much farther towards the East than the French race and the French tongue ever extended.

The question we are facing today is this: should another thousand years of war be added to the thousand bloody years that have gone before? Among the wisest words that Aristide Briand ever spoke was his remark that both these nations had gathered sufficient honors in the century-old contest, but that now the time had arrived where both of them had to think of their most vital interests in common. Of course, to renounce a prolongation of this contest and

its settlement in our favor, is much harder for us Germans than for the French. After all, it is we who lost a province so thoroughly German; we who, in post-War times, have tasted the bitterness of humiliation under the treatment to which France subjected us. Nevertheless, this is a renunciation that is necessary for the sake of Europe as well as for the sake of Germany.

The consummation of an understanding between Germany and France presents a most difficult task, even for men who are convinced of this necessity, because of the deep-rooted suspicion that estranges the two countries. Germany is apprehensive of French imperialism and French annexations; France, on the other hand, dreads the German desire for revenge. This suspicion is the more profound as every nation considers itself noble and decent, while the opponent is judged as shrewd and diabolically inspired. Time and again, I was told in France four years ago: "You certainly were clever, you Germans. First, while a policy of humiliation was your order of the day, you left the helm to the Social-Democrats. Then, when conditions improved, the parties of the Middle took over the government. Now, your parties of the Right are in the saddle and soon enough we will have a war of revenge."

It is an astounding, but inescapable fact, that

it is always supposed that the will of others is thoroughly unified, while such unanimity of purpose is sadly lacking in one's own people. One assumes that in the other camp rôles are picked out for the various actors with utmost care. In reality, politics are almost at a standstill because the actors on the political stage insist on shouting at each other without waiting for their cues. It is generally supposed that there is an over-abundance of intrigue in politics, while, in truth, it is mostly an interplay of grave and dangerous recklessness. Each and every people comprises divergent views and tendencies.

Besides, there are politicians on both sides of the Rhine, who, for demagogic reasons, like to indulge in boastful talk. At the unveiling of statues and at veteran meetings such men glory in taking the center of the stage. Their own people do not look upon them so very seriously because it is generally understood that they are talking for domestic consumption. But the evil-minded press—and there is one in both countries which is unanimous only in one thing: that the people should never come to understand each other clearly—this press takes up such speeches, giving them wide publicity as the quintessence of public opinion and the reflection of the views of leading statesmen. Such speeches are pounced upon and elaborated in a

manner never enjoyed by sensible, peaceful addresses that deserve to be broadcast.

Suspicion is often referred to as a virtue of diplomacy. To be sure, diplomacy would be a simple art if its only task consisted in arousing and maintaining suspicion. The real art of diplomacy is the ability to discern the fine line that divides suspicion and confidence. To extirpate suspicion between Germany and France should be the foremost task of the responsible statesmen in both camps.

It must be stated here candidly, although this statement will cause severe head-shaking in Germany, and French ears will certainly be displeased listening to it, that France's policy, aiming at security, arises from the fact that France fears Germany's revenge. France, apparently, does not see the weakness of German armament; she does not conceive the tremendous change in regard to Germany's political orientation. This is a change which permeates the decided majority of the populace, and has by now created a popular point of view, readily impressing every statesman with the fact that a war of revenge would prove impossible. All France sees is the numerical superiority of the German people, its efficiency, its inventive genius, and its economic stamina. France is apprehensive of Germany's *potentiel de guerre*—her potentialities to carry on

war. Then too, France believes that it will be possible for Germany to conclude alliances. Formerly, France anticipated the victory of Bolshevism which would weld Russia and Germany into an opponent five times superior to France. Today, France fears the victory of Fascism in Germany, visualizing Germany as siding with Italy. There are German statesmen belonging to the parties of the Right, who, in their speeches, like to dwell upon this thought, primarily for reasons of domestic politics. If they really had the interest of foreign politics at heart, they would rather keep silent, and not proclaim their point of view from the housetops. I am sure I am not overstating facts when I insist that at least ninety-five per cent of all Germans have no sympathy for such ideas; they have not yet forgotten what the last alliance with Italy did for them. That France's Minister of War, Painlevé, a man who surely has no tendency to embark upon wars of conquest, insisted on tremendous armament, is undoubtedly the result of all this loose talk, especially in view of the growing differences between France and Italy.

Still another difficulty arises from the fact that politics of today are not induced by the fundamentals of chivalry, but rather by economic necessities. Each party longs for an understanding, but it is impossible to create this

understanding merely by depending upon implicit confidence in the other party. Statesmen of today are not unlike lawyers who, in the interests of their client, must needs insist upon having everything in black and white. In this connection, it is interesting to recall, as very significant, the fact that when the Locarno Pact came before the *Reichstag,* neither the Chancellor nor the Foreign Minister dared to dwell upon the important political and ethical angle of the rapprochement; both limited themselves to explaining the different clauses of the Pact, pointing out those that were favorable for Germany. Stresemann postponed his great peace speech until the Locarno Pacts were signed in London.

Poincaré, France's leader of long standing, seemed more than any other statesman to proceed from a strictly economic basis. It is wrong to look upon him as a great Imperialist. His invasion of the Ruhr was, intrinsically, nothing else but a visit of the sheriff who is supposed to collect the very last cent of a judgment. Poincaré's statecraft is that of a meticulous but petty administrator of his country, and is typical of the French character.

Far-sightedness, on the other hand, is the especial gift of the English. In this connection, it may be recalled with what vision the English proceeded in the eighteenth century when, after

the conquest of Canada, the French inhabitants were given home rule and religious freedom, in this way immunizing them against the virus of American freedom. Another instance of England's political acumen is the treatment she accorded the Boers, after she had subjugated them by a bloody war. There is also her conciliatory conduct toward Germany after the War, as a result of which England regained Germany's sympathy long before France. It is policies such as these, boasting a splendid spirit of enterprise, with which English gentlemen carry on their businesses. The French are a people of small *rentiers* and farmers, who hesitate to part with their possessions before they have actually received an equivalent.

All these circumstances contribute toward making negotiations slow and laborious. Those who do not participate in these negotiations directly should certainly feel constrained to support the rapprochement by moral disarmament. It is just as wrong, on the German side, to indulge in talk of revenge as it is, on the part of the French, to reiterate ideas of annexation. As regards that moral disarmament to be found between the covers of school books, we Germans, by eliminating jingoistic cant, have made much more progress than the French, but our teaching personnel does not yet demonstrate the same understanding for this problem of

reconciliation. International meetings, on a basis of equal footing, will serve to further the acquaintance of the nations and strengthen their trust in one another. If both countries can learn to forget, Europe's future is insured.

The League of Nations

The League of Nations is perhaps the most important agent for the realization of German freedom and equality. What I stated before, about the necessity of an evolutionary pacifism, can best be accomplished by elevating the League of Nations to a higher plane.

There still may be doubts as to the importance and authority of the League of Nations. Skepticism may also be entertained by some as to whether the importance and authority, which friends of peace and reconciliation attach to the League, will become a fact within the next ten or only after fifty years. But it is beyond doubt that the League of Nations is stronger today, and more sure of its potentialities, than it was ten years ago. And it is also certain that it will succeed in making headway and that its prestige will increase with the years.

According to Kant, the idea of humanity assembling and jointly taking council to regulate its common and diversified affairs, is philosophically and firmly founded and is as practi-

cal as it is logical. This theory, once given a timorous test, is bound to persist and grow, nurtured by actualities.

It is easy to ridicule some phases of the League proceedings. As a matter of fact, it is just as easy to scorn parliamentarism for the reason that parliamentary proceedings are not always dignified. True, it becomes tiresome to listen to long drawn out debates, full of generalities, in which delegates, time and again, address the League in laboriously turned and carefully propounded phrases. Of course, it may be desirable to maintain the ceremonial courtesy with which a speaker attempts to create the impression that the utterances of a previous speaker amounted to the most precious pearls of wisdom, although in reality they were nothing but trite platitudes. It would be much more desirable, however, if the speakers before the forum of the League of Nations would endeavor to adhere closely to facts, in a more business-like fashion. I think it would be greatly appreciated all around if some of the delegates would divorce themselves from the methods of the old diplomacy. There are still some who prefer to fish in troubled waters, considering it one of the most cherished traditions of statecraft to shroud the intentions of their governments in opaque darkness. They would be doing better to put their cards on the

table and plainly express what everybody in the assembly knows anyhow and is ready to take into full consideration.

But these are features that will improve, the more frequent meetings of the League become and the more the delegates in general succeed in suppressing the apprehension that they must not step too firmly on new ground. It is also desirable to accept the opinion that, by adjourning a case, a problem can never be solved. The latter method reminds me of an old superior of mine who repeatedly admonished me when, with youthful enthusiasm, I proceeded too speedily in unraveling such problems as faced us: "You don't know, my dear young friend, how many pending cases are best taken care of by the simple expedient of just leaving them alone." Of course, a politician has no real right to complain about such conditions, so long as there persists, within the boundaries of his own country, a decided tendency to put off difficult decisions, even if a majority could be found to vote for a particular measure. If I think of some of the problems that were dragged out, over and over again, in my own country, I wax tolerant in reviewing the proceedings of the League of Nations. After all, the League of Nations is an organization which, in view of the fact that the sovereignty of the individual states is meticulously observed, re-

quires unanimous acceptance of its decisions. For this reason, it seems advisable to refrain from too strenuous tests of strength which would serve only to intensify contrasting views. These, in most cases, would prove impossible to eliminate.

So far as we Germans are concerned, our cooperation within the League of Nations was painfully hampered as long as we were unable to see in the League anything but an instrument of the victors to maintain the Treaty of Versailles. We entered the League in order to defend ourselves against unjustified demands, and with the hope of improving Germany's condition. The best way to grasp the actual meaning of the League is to analyze the very soul of the smaller members. In studying the smaller European, and most of the overseas members of the League, it becomes clear that, to them, the League of Nations will never mean an instrument of national politics, but rather a means to surmount boundaries, to bring peoples closer to one another, and to take council jointly on all problems that concern them.

At the same time, I can fully understand that the victors in the World War, either individually or collectively, when organizing the League, were not exactly inspired by humanitarian thoughts. Many of them perceived in the founding of the League something similar to

the Holy Alliance of Prince Metternich after the Napoleonic wars; that is, an institution to aid in securing the gains of the victors. However, the powers behind the League are deplorably misunderstood if it is taken for granted that even today, and in the long run, the importance of the League is based solely upon the victors' hope of holding on to their spoils. The general trend toward independence and—I say this without any reservation, although I may be taken for a political dreamer—the inherent feeling for justice that especially permeates the smaller states, are too pronounced to permit an egotistical interpretation of the true meaning of the League.

The League of Nations, incepted to carry out the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, gradually grew into an organization for conciliatory coöperation between the nations. At the meeting of the League, in September, 1929, where, for the first time, liquidation problems of the War did not absorb the foreground for us, our position was greatly improved. It was possible for us to participate in the deliberations in an utterly different spirit, our viewpoint meanwhile having changed. Even if the League were not charged with political tasks, it would constitute a very helpful, nay, indispensable organization because it gives leading statesmen a chance to establish personal con-

tacts. Meetings of monarchs and princes, before the War, did not do much to enhance and maintain peace. On the contrary it is an established fact that, as a rule, the regattas at Cowes resulted in a general aggravation of royal squabbles. At their meeting at Björkö, the Kaiser and the Czar arrived at such an impossible agreement that their respective ministers tore up the drafts, in this way intensifying already existing frictions. The former Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, shortly after the War, told me that one reason why it proved impossible for him to avoid an armed conflict in July, 1914, resulted from the fact that he knew personally hardly a single one of the leading European statesmen. No matter what one thinks about the get-together breakfasts and banquets at Geneva and the style in which these affairs are arranged, there is no denying that personal meetings on a common ground are of utmost importance. It is in Geneva that diplomats, legislators and journalists become personally acquainted with one another, and it is they who are entrusted with the maintenance of peace and cordial relations between nations. It is chiefly suspicion that prevents understanding. The better acquainted we become in Geneva, the more obvious it will become that nations in general are governed by mature and conscientious men. In representing their

respective countries, they desire nothing so much as equanimity of soul, if such can be maintained at a reasonable price. It is certain that those who assemble at Geneva will never jeopardize the peace of Europe. Far more dangerous are those who remain at home.

Undoubtedly, the League of Nations, although in its first stages, has proved itself successful in more than one respect. There is the improvement, at least temporary, of Austria's finances, and also the successful avoidance of armed conflicts that threatened to occur between Italy and Greece and Bulgaria and Greece. Moreover, the League induced coöperation between countries in cultural, social and economic questions. So far as the international aspect of traffic in vice and hygienic problems are concerned, the League convincingly proved itself a clearing house for combative measures.

However, the task of the League of Nations is not fulfilled by merely maintaining the *status quo*. We are not exactly living in a time of peace, but only in a period where there happens to be no actual warfare. It is not sufficient to reiterate: "No more wars!" It is necessary to find, in the first place, a secure basis for peaceful coöperation between the nations although it will prove impossible to work out a permanent plan, for the simple reason that the world continually changes. That which seems

justified and tolerable today, may prove unjust, unfair and intolerable tomorrow. Therefore, it is not sufficient to have a League of Nations which only aims at maintaining the present status of things. In order to avoid dangerous international explosions, politics must be evolved to a level where it will furnish the necessary safety valve.

Those who do not study the books of history, who do not believe that wars can solve international controversies or should never be resorted to as a suitable means to further justice in this world, must guard against a conservative pacifism, preferring an evolutionary pacifism. This is the very reason why I believe that world peace can be secured by the League neither by proceeding with primitive measures against nations who disturb the peace, nor by rejecting those who are dissatisfied with conditions as they exist. Such primitive measures and such authority are necessary for the League, but they are very far from sufficient. It will prove impossible, in the long run, to ignore justified demands which aim at a change in the intolerable conditions that prevail. Those who present justified demands to the League, only to have their pleadings fall on deaf ears, cannot be blamed if they lose confidence in the League.

The position assumed by Count Apponyi,

during the last meeting at Geneva, was applauded by the parties of the German Right. Apponyi's views coincide with mine. The Count, a venerable and redoubtable personality, declared himself basically and unequivocally against the restoration of Hungary by armed intervention, at the same time looking to the League, almost too hopefully, for assistance. I quote here from his speech because it seems so extremely pertinent:

"May I not be permitted to say just a few more words about the spirit which in general should prevail at our meetings? M. Briand mentioned that the new generation should be educated in the spirit of understanding so as to erase from their hearts the spirit of war and of revenge. I agree with him. Nevertheless, we must take it for granted that not every thought of human coöperation and of patriotism should disappear from the hearts of children. Patriotism and national hatred are utterly different sentiments. On this, we most probably all agree, but when it comes to the application of this axiom, there might be differences of opinion. How different are those countries that bask in the sun of fulfilled ambitions and glory in their superiority! How different are they from

those who dwell in the shadow of desolation!—who daily look upon their dismembered country! Everybody will readily admit that there is a decided dissimilarity between these two groups.

"For the one, it is much easier to proclaim ideas of brotherhood, easier because at the same time they are agreeing to a status which secures superiority for them. How can I show a map of Hungary to an Hungarian boy, who will see on this map only a remnant of what his country once was, and at the same time assure him that everything is in the best of order?

"How shall I explain to this young Hungarian that one of the greatest principles of our time—for example, the right of self-determination—was applied in the case of Hungary when, in the face of facts, the boy cannot help noticing that great numbers of his co-nationals live under the rule of foreign countries today? And if I told him that he simply has to be satisfied with this state of affairs, as it is final, then the pure and noble soul of this young Hungarian would turn against such teachings.

"Of course, I could tell him: our situation is difficult, but we must never think of war in order to change things. There is no logical connection between the right-

eousness of a cause, and the strength of weapons, which decides military victories. Even those who take up arms for the sake of justice usually overstep the boundaries of the very justice for which they fought, should they happen to emerge victorious from the fray. Then, the fighter for justice himself commits an injustice. And this, after all, is the most poignant misfortune of war—that it creates a vicious circle. It is for these reasons that I would say to the young Hungarian: do not look for war to change the present situation! Rather try to discover a way out by developing the human conscience, by developing that spirit which more and more aims at basing human relations upon justice, upon respect for the fundamental conditions of the national existence of every country! Look for institutions whose task it is to secure peace, whose endeavor it is gradually to eliminate injustice from this world.

"I am firmly convinced that the day will come when it will be generally admitted that prevailing mistakes and injustices cannot be banished from the world by improving means and methods to this end. The germs for such differences are not to be found in the imperfection of the procedure, but rather in the things *per se*. I know

very well that I shall be told then: there will never come such a time; what is today will be for all time; you must simply make the best of it. By insisting upon a point of view that will never be recognized, you only invite disagreeable experiences.

"This argument, even if propounded before the assembly of the League of Nations, even if accepted by the highest political authorities, cannot impress one who witnessed the genesis of the second French empire, beholding it in its triumph and in its decline; who witnessed, too, the rise of the Hohenzollern empire, seeing it at the pinnacle of its power and who was a spectator at its downfall; who also lived to see, and actively participated in, the reorganization of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, only to watch it disintegrate in the end. All these different epochs in history were inaugurated under the impression that they were final and would prove unchangeable. If in any matter of human concern I am told that things be unchangeable and definite, I can only answer: tell that to somebody else!"

At the same meetings of the League of Nations a step in the right direction was made by the Chinese with their motion requesting

an explicit interpretation of Article XIX of the covenant of the League. It is this clause which provides for an investigation of agreements that have become inapplicable, and seem liable to endanger the peace of the world. It is easy to understand what motivated the Chinese. China is chafing under certain concessions which, dating back decades, are considered intolerable by a sovereign state, encroaching as they do upon the dignity of a people imbued with national pride. China cannot and does not want to abrogate these agreements by war. On the other hand, China has no means to eliminate these agreements by peaceful measures, unless the League of Nations comes to her assistance. Suppose China refuses any longer to recognize these agreements, should the League of Nations, taking recourse to all means at its disposal according to the covenant, actually proceed against China in order to force her to recognize antiquated treaties? If that be the case, the new international justice, as embodied in the League of Nations, would run true to the old adage: *summum jus, summa injuria.**

I consider it extremely important that China's motion, energetically seconded by the German delegation, met with tangible results be-

*Extreme law, extreme injustice.

fore the forum of the League. It cannot be denied that the idea underlying the Chinese motion will recur, time and again, in one form or another. As a matter of fact, such a development must be the hope of all who desire the League of Nations to grow more influential in the future. If the League of Nations really aims at preserving and increasing its importance it will be impossible for it to ignore such problems in the light of a general progress in human affairs. Relations between nations based on juridical conditions which, according to Article XIX, have either become inapplicable, or whose maintenance may prove dangerous to world peace, must be eliminated by the League.

The Chinese problem does not furnish the only example. There is the Hungarian frontier problem, the German boundaries in the East, and—above all—the treatment of minorities, of which more will be said.

It will be Germany's task in the League to champion those who are suffering from suppression and injustice. Our rôle, within the League, is similar to that which Russia unsuccessfully tried to assume outside of the League. Disappointment was felt because Stresemann was thought to have sided too much with the Western members of the League. However, it seems as if the general lack of decisiveness, which the smaller members of the League dis-

played, made it impossible for him to embark upon a different policy, at least for the time being, and while England and France exerted a conservative influence on the League. Stresemann countered all such reproaches very cleverly by proving that a basis for a different policy was completely lacking. During the last meeting of the League, England retreated noticeably from her former policy. In this way, chances for a more progressive policy of the League have undergone a change for the better.

While, during the first years as a member of the League, it was Germany's task to explain to the world her aims and accept acclaim for them, it now becomes Germany's mission to propagate the idea that Right must come before Might.

CHAPTER VI

Pan-Europe

Should there be another agreement and coalition among the peoples of Europe, aside from the League of Nations? I reply to this question affirmatively without being in the least deluded by the fact that, on a continent as disunited as Europe, the realization of such an idea will encounter formidable difficulties.

Europe will become a new Balkan if her peoples, always suspiciously eyeing one another, continue to arm themselves to their very teeth. The danger is always present that, almost against the will of those concerned, either by mistake or by suspicion, war is possible. Besides, Europe's delegates must cease visiting foreign continents for the sole purpose of borrowing money for the purchase of more war material. In this way, Europe invites the danger of American hegemony. Already today, the American looks upon the European in a way not unlike that in which the old Romans looked upon the Greeks. Sure enough, they consider them peoples of great traditions and of a glorious past, clever and experienced in the

arts and sciences, but utterly unable to play the game of unified and practical politics.

The coalition of European countries cannot be easily disposed of with the objection that European peoples differ greatly as to race, economic requirements and cultural attainments. It is true that, as far as we Germans are concerned, the American and his customs and views come much closer to us than the Portuguese or even the Roumanian. Nevertheless, the ever recurrent idea of a European coalition results from the necessity to unify, in some way or other, neighboring countries which, at the present time of world politics and world economics, find it necessary to look for means that will insure the survival of their culture and safeguard their very existence. The United States of America is organized in a federation, a tremendous political entity. It is for this reason that America's statesmen and economists do not compare the union with a single one of the European countries, but rather—by putting the individual federal states on the same basis with the individual European states—with Europe as a whole. Of course, Europe lacks that unification which is typical of the American federation. Moreover, the United States of America endeavors to be more than that: to constitute the entire American continent. Even if this ambition, espoused at Pan-American congresses, is

still in its beginning, and even though the Spanish States in Central and South America resist too close a connection with the great union of the North, the fact remains that America, so far as Europe is concerned, represents a unity based on the Monroe Doctrine. While, on one hand, South American members of the League sit in on deliberations on strictly European affairs, the League would never venture to undertake a decisive step in South American affairs because that could be interpreted as interfering with the Monroe Doctrine. This fact alone would justify a union of European states, perhaps only within the League and presumably in the form of a secondary coalition, in the interest of European affairs.

There is another unification movement discernible on the horizon: the Pan-Asiatic movement. Pan-Asiatic congresses have already met, time and again, and as soon as China succeeds in setting her house in order, her four hundred million people will logically lead the Pan-Asiatic coalition. But still more imminent for Europe is the danger of the semi-Asiatic Russian Bolshevism. If the peoples of Europe cannot come to an understanding, there is a possibility that the future boundary between Asia and America will be advanced to either the Rhine or the Vistula.

Then, too, there are internal reasons for a

European coalition. As I explained before, when dwelling on the question of national security, it is impossible to induce European states to disarm because the armament of the one always forces the neighbor to follow suit. The League of Nations, in its present none too firm organization, is unable to protect the individual European states against the danger of war. It will prove rather difficult to evolve matters within the League to such a degree that the danger of war is definitely allayed. Perhaps the coalition of European states will prove less Utopian than the evolution of the League of Nations into a supra-national organization with far-reaching authority and sufficient power to command obeyance. Only if the European countries protect each one against the other and against non-European states is it possible for them to enjoy their existence.

Analogous conditions prevail in the realm of economics. Conditions of production and consumption are much more favorable in America than in Europe. In America, raw materials are easily obtainable. Production finds a field of one hundred and forty millions and may be carried on without interference by high tariffs and other customs complication. In Europe, each country, even the new small states, nurse their industries with loving care. Some of them do this for the one and only reason that, in case

of war, they might have to convert these particular industries to war purposes. There are certain economic questions which can be solved more easily and more satisfactorily for Europe than for the world at large. A customs union with America and Australia will remain an Utopia for some time to come! As a matter of fact, this idea will still be unrealized when Europe, for her own salvation, takes recourse to a European customs union. Time and again, the Americans have suggested free trade for Europe. If their attention is directed to the fact that they themselves believe in a protective tariff policy, the reply is that there is free trade within the union and that the union, as such, is an organization not unlike Europe.

Another common interest of Europe presents itself in the problem of emigration. Should non-European countries, possessing greater wealth of raw material per capita than European countries, exclude European immigration more and more, the necessity for a realignment of intra-European conditions would then become increasingly acute. Another complication is added by the question whether Europe can permit non-European countries to accept only those of her people that are considered especially valuable. By such a procedure, non-European countries would be the gainers in the same ratio in which Europe, depleted of her

worthwhile contingents, would be the loser. It might become necessary to enter into agreements in this matter by which fairer conditions of distribution may be established.

There is another psychological movement which must not be under-estimated. More and more, the European faces the danger of developing an inferiority complex when comparing himself with the American. There is no reason for this embarrassment on the part of the poor European. If one hundred plants are transplanted to a soil which can easily nourish three hundred, they will develop better than the others, left to grow as best they can in overcrowded surroundings. The American has the advantage of being more optimistic than the European; moreover, the American is much more enterprising because he dwells in a country of unlimited possibilities. No worthwhile undertaking in America remains unexploited for lack of means, as is frequently the case in Europe. It is my opinion that if he be given sufficient freedom of action and sufficiently worthwhile tasks, the European, possessor of an older culture and of better education, will not lag behind the American.

The greatest difficulty in connection with the Pan-European problem is the English question. Count Coudenhove-Calergi, leader of the Pan-European movement, made it somewhat easy

for himself by decreeing that England is no European country at all. Undoubtedly, the most vital interests of England lie across the sea. But on the basis of what I have said before about England and its relation to European culture, England remains a European country. Europe without England is incomplete. Recently, Count Coudenhove revised his original formula, and declared that it must be left to England's own decision whether she wishes to organize herself together with her dominions as a world-wide entity, while entertaining close relations to Pan-Europe, or whether she wants to join Europe. I believe that English statecraft will know how to avoid this dilemma, but, on the other hand, the Pan-European idea must yet grow considerably before such questions are ripe for discussion with England. So far as Germany is concerned, it seems impossible that she could join any European coalition directed against England. Any option between Europe and England implies danger for Germany.

Regarding Russia, it will not be necessary to display such extreme caution. Russia, if she desires it, can easily join such a European coalition. Nevertheless, her cooperation is not exactly necessary. Besides, as long as Russia's political complexion remains what it is, it will not be possible to figure on her coöperation.

There is no reason to expect that the United

States of America would oppose the scheme of an organized Europe. The United States desires a flourishing Europe, and the possibility for this is enhanced if Europe's states coöperate with one another. America is sure to prefer such a Europe to one permanently on the verge of wars. After all, Europe's unification would not be a movement directed against the United States, but rather one in her interest.

The fact that, to a Pan-Europe, France would have to contribute her colonies, need not necessarily be looked upon with apprehension. These colonies are neither as independent as are the English dominions, nor are they as important in their relations to the motherland. By and large, it appears that it would be greatly in the interest of these colonies themselves, as well as for the best for Europe as a whole, if it were possible to settle France's African possessions with a greater quota of Europeans than France herself can spare for the proper exploitation of her dependencies.

This very problem was shifted from a sphere of mere academic and propagandistic deliberations to a point of political negotiations by M. Briand himself, who opened the question at the meeting of the League of Nations at Geneva. However, that which M. Briand stated in this connection was, at best, somewhat superficial. Besides, there are many who view Bri-

and's procedure suspiciously, because they look upon it as a new attempt to bring Europe under the hegemony of France. Others suspect in it an endeavor to deflect attention from the growing rapprochement between the two Anglo-Saxon nations by giving the world at large some fresh food for thought. Both motives are palpable to me. Nevertheless, I do not think that the entire matter, in its present stand, is worth losing much time over in discussion. It never yet has happened that an idea has been advanced only by those who are unselfish. Moreover, it was a decided oversight of pre-War Germany to receive new departures with an air of cool detachment, in this way gaining the reputation of being reactionary and militaristic. Even if an idea springs from egotistic motives, it should not be turned down without further investigation as to its intrinsic merits. It is for this reason that I warmly applauded the way in which Stresemann took notice of M. Briand's words, making it a point to explain that he, for the time being, agreed to the economic part of the suggestion only.

In the long run, an economic rapprochement will prove impossible without exerting a certain influence for more cordial relations in the political field. Both questions are inseparable.

That the majority of European countries foster their own industries for political reasons

only, and in order to be prepared in time of war, is only one of the many mistakes of which they are guilty. No European state can sit by and watch the economic progress of a neighbor with equanimity so long as there is a likelihood that the ambitious state will attempt to exploit its economic successes by political encroachments upon the rights of the other.

In view of the French proposition, the necessity arises for Germany to reply with a counter-proposition. Germany will have to declare that she is willing to join a political coalition in Europe provided the armament of all European countries is curtailed in the same proportion. Germany will have to state, furthermore, that peaceful coöperation among the peoples of Europe seems impossible as long as there are states which interfere with the racial development of their minorities. Besides, it must be pointed out emphatically that there no longer exists the slightest excuse to oppose the union of Austria and Germany—the *Anschluss*—if there is no possibility left for these two countries to entertain common war plans against other European nations. Another point to be raised will be the intolerable delineation of the eastern frontiers of Germany and the necessity to settle these problems as a preparatory step.

Whenever these conditions are fulfilled, Pan-Europe, if understood correctly and organized

logically, will offer Germany the possibility of a compensation for being forced to dwell within boundaries much too limited for a nation of its gifts, its education, its spirit of enterprise and its industry. If it proves impossible to secure for Germany a bigger and better field for her cultural and economic endeavors, she will be hopelessly lost. In the Germany of today, hardly a single individual ever attains the position to which he might lay claims on the strength of his abilities. The great difference between Germany and America is that, in America, jobs are looking for men, in Germany, men, the very best among us, are seeking jobs. Whatever is the heritage of Germany should be utilized for the best of the world instead of being stifled by lack of opportunities or squandered in petty contests of competition.

In political respects, Pan-Europe would mean to Germany redemption from an ever-present danger of being outraged by neighboring countries. In a war-like Europe, Germany's position in the very centre of the continent is most unfavorable. In a Europe definitely settling to peaceful tasks, Germany's position, in the very centre of the continent, is extremely favorable. A German foreign policy, not actually afflicted with blindness, will always be able to prevent a coalition of the European countries under the economic or political hegemony of

any other country. As a matter of fact, in a coalition founded on modern principles, such a thing as hegemony will neither exist nor be necessary at all.

Of course, it is rather doubtful whether M. Briand's proposal, submitted to the European powers in May, 1930, really spells progress. However, objections against it should not be raised because it aims at establishing political security prior to economic cooperation, but because M. Briand's suggestion visualizes security for Europe on the basis of a stabilization of existing conditions only. To this Germany must reply: security only by first revising present European conditions! Such a demand does not at all constitute a chasm, impossible to bridge. I am of the opinion that the coalition will come about gradually. After two or more great European powers organize themselves, it will be a matter of unavoidable necessity for the others to follow.

For the inception of a European coalition, I can see only two possibilities: the one consisting of Germany, France, Belgium and Holland making the beginning. The other, much more desirable, of the old idea of a central-European coalition as propounded by Naumann* coming

*Friedrich Naumann was the protagonist of an economic *Mittel-Europa.*

to the fore once more. All these theories offer much to the German people and only a very short-sighted policy can afford to brush them aside without closest investigation.

CHAPTER VII

THE GERMAN REALM

World Economics

Mittel-Europa is of greater importance to Germany than is Pan-Europe. A progressive and optimistic people such as the German, imbued with the urge to advance, require—if all ideas of conquest by arms are discarded—a field of endeavor to satisfy cultural and economic ambitions outside the narrow limits of their own country. Regardless of how great are the changes wrought by the World War, Naumann's theory that Germany's field of endeavor is *Mittel-Europa,* which ought to be extended toward the Southeast, still holds true. Germany has not the slightest intention of acquiring new territories by annexation. Nevertheless, to the East and Southeast of Germany, the language of commerce is German and it is German education and German efficiency which find abundant opportunities in that locality. Those regions are more or less closely sprinkled with German minorities which, as far as education and wealth are concerned, are in many cases far superior to the majorities among which they dwell. Moreover, it is frequently the Ger-

man influence in these countries which makes itself decisively felt in regard to economic and political measures. In this connection the importance of the much criticized Eastern Jews who fled from Germany in the Middle Ages, and whose influx is not always considered very desirable for Germany, must not be under-estimated. In view of the fact that the Yiddish-German language preserves the Middle High German of Walter von der Vogelweide, the East-Jews are charged with the fulfilment of a great mission. A country like England, that quickly seizes upon every advantage that offers itself, would better know how to utilize this Jewish element. England surely would treat them differently than we, not only during the Polish occupation, but even today, if for no other reason than from a feeling of easy superiority.

The same thought underlying Germany's endeavor to bring about a European coalition and a general European rapprochement, should characterize her exertions for closer international coöperation, at least in the field of economics. Germany, as a country, is too limited for the proper exploitation of German potentialities. It is doomed to die if it lacks sufficient international commerce. Germany depends upon export trade in order to enable her, in turn, to buy necessary raw materials in foreign coun-

tries. Besides, Germany relies upon international economics to employ her surplus population within her own boundaries. In the forty years prior to the World War, within a comparatively small area, a people of forty million grew into seventy million—a phenomenon never before achieved. Problems of overpopulation were formerly solved either by conquest, or by the weeding-out process of emigragration, starvation, wars and plagues. Germany, in close contact with all problems of international economics, by building up her exports, succeeded in obtaining the necessary capital for the extension of domestic production. In this way, it became possible, under tolerable conditions, for her to support an increasing population ever ready to toil and rejoice in their labor. Germany's record, in pre-War times, was without precedent. England can discharge her economic obligations only because she is supported by foreign enterprises whose profits serve to equalize the entire British import surplus. America solves the same problem more simply because not less than one-third of all the raw materials in the entire world is at the disposal of American industry. As far as Germany's labor is concerned, her profit, as stated before, is usually limited to the difference between the prices of the imported raw materials and the receipts for the finished product.

Aside from this, post-War Germany faces a still more gigantic task. Post-War Germany not only must maintain herself, but in addition, she is obliged to pay tremendous amounts in gold and goods to her former opponents. In order to accomplish this, Germany must rely on the heads and hands of its inhabitants who must produce for the whole world in order to keep themselves alive. If it were not for the fact that the Germans are fortunate enough to be, in education and training, generations ahead of the new countries, it would prove impossible for us to perform successfully the tremendous task imposed upon us. There is hardly any other country in the entire world so vitally interested in the perfection and extension of world economics as is Germany. Here is a country inhabited by a population that would waste away, within its own boundaries, if it should work merely to satisfy its own needs. On the other hand, Germany is perfectly able and willing to furnish the world with first-class products if only given the opportunity to do so.

The necessity of a suitable field for world-economical extension for Germany cannot be denied with the assertion that agricultural reform may be resorted to as a way out. Such endeavor, in the interest of the German people, cannot be encouraged enough, although one must not overlook its limitations. Even opti-

mists admit that if the big estates now in the hands of landed proprietors were divided, the resulting small farms would hardly suffice to yield a livelihood for one to two million people.

Now, as before, Caprivi's assertion proves correct: that if Germany does not export merchandise, she must export men.* We must brand as slanderous, statements in which the radicals of the Right insist that the result of the Young Plan will be the peonage of Germany under alien masters. The truth simply is: only by international understanding, and applied international economics, will it be possible to prevent an exodus. Besides, if a new period of emigration is inaugurated, Germany, in contrast to her experiences in the nineteenth century, will not lose primarily untrained labor and "second sons" only, because farm property meanwhile has become more expensive all over the world and manual labor is performed both cheaper and better by colored hands. A new emigration would draw upon the academically trained, the technicians, merchants, and artisans, the most valuable components of our population. Without them, it will be impossible for us to provide a tolerable existence for our people, and to discharge our obligations to our War veterans, War orphans and War widows.

*Count von Caprivi, Imperial German Chancellor after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890.

It was indeed very fortunate that Germany, at the Conference at Geneva, so decisively declared herself in favor of world economics. Translated into practice, such ideas will still encounter tremendous obstacles. The elimination of customs frontiers will prove very difficult because contemporary society considers its most important task that of protecting invested capital, even if this capital, in the light of modern economical views, be invested none too wisely. Moreover, the dominant idea in concluding commercial treaties is still the urge to obtain individual advantages, instead of laying a foundation for far-sighted world economic policies.

Germany's Colonial Policy

Will it prove enough for Germany to insist upon a policy of the open door in world economics? Shall Germany definitely renounce any and all ambitions to secure for herself overseas markets in her old colonies?

Every German is incensed over the clause in the Treaty of Versailles upon which is based the confiscation of the German colonies, the excuse being given that Germany did not prove to be a suitable colonizer. Facts furnish proof to the contrary. Moreover, there is a wealth of foreign testimony, especially English, giving the lie to that nefarious clause. If ever Ger-

many regains her colonial possessions, she will again convincingly demonstrate that she is an able colonizer.

But I, for one, would be a little wary about accepting an offer from our former opponents to restore to us a small and valueless colony, just for the sake of enlisting us, once more, in the ranks of Colonial powers. When our opponents, during the War, hurled black and yellow men against us, they made a breach in the united front of the white powers. There is no reason in the world for us to re-align ourselves with the colonial powers, and for the sake of a paltry prize allow ourselves to be drawn into fighting their battles against non-European peoples who feel the urge of emancipation. The time has passed when, in Colonial wars, Germans could be flattered by the command "Germans to the front!"*

To all appearances, economically as well as culturally, it will be much more profitable for Germany to be the champion of oppressed races than to join the oppressor nations. It is much more important for her to succeed with her ideas of peaceful penetration into the commerce of non-European countries, along the lines suggested by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht some time ago. Such ideas, according to my mind, open up a

*This command dates back to the Boxer War of 1900, when it was issued by the British Commander-in-Chief.

great future for over-populated Germany. As soon as Germany has regained her strength financially and industrially, many of the nations of Africa, Asia and South America will be glad to invite Germans to their countries, for the purpose of settling in areas especially reserved for them. And although they will accept these Germans as an integral part of themselves, they will not insist upon depriving them of their German culture and their allegiance to the Fatherland.

German Minorities

It is wrong to hold out to all the Germans in foreign countries the one great hope of uniting them politically with the Fatherland. There are Germans living near the German frontier who should belong to Germany politically. These Germans we will always try to regain for the *Reich*. But, on the other hand, there are Germans dwelling in more or less isolated sections in the East, Northeast, and Southeast of Europe. They themselves consider the idea of rejoining Germany as Utopian. Nevertheless, in regard to these people, Germany is justified in demanding that all their racial and cultural characteristics be recognized.

There are also Germans in foreign countries across the sea, who can resist progressing assimilation only partly. With these Germans,

too, the Fatherland must remain in cultural contact as long as possible because they constitute a valuable part of the German people. In their adopted countries, they are able to awaken and maintain love and respect for all things German, at the same time comporting themselves as good citizens of their chosen lands.

There are twenty-one European states in which Germans have settled. There is no European nation so strongly interested in the problems of minority as Germany, and the solution of these problems is a vital question for her because thereupon depends the preservation of German culture and German racial strength. Moreover, the solution of the minority problem is of the utmost importance to the League of Nations, because the stability of European peace rests upon it.

The Peace Treaty of 1919 recognized, as an imminent task, the division of Europe into national states. I shall not try to investigate here whether a solution of this problem was seriously desired and impartially inaugurated. At any rate, a solution is still lacking and there are more minorities in Europe today than before the War. Fully ten millions, that is, one-thirtieth of present-day Europe (with the exception of Russia), are subjects of states foreign to their racial descent. Most of them are Germans, but there are also Hungarians, Bulgari-

ans, South-Slavs, Swedes, Poles and many others.

However, no matter how unsatisfactory, how unjust, and how needy of revision these peace treaties may be, there is one point that any impartial judge must concede: although it may prove possible to solve the problem on the basis of the national states principle in its entirety in West and Central Europe, it will prove absolutely impossible to make satisfactory arrangements in East and Southeast Europe. No delineation of frontiers, although undertaken ever so painstakingly, will ever succeed in eliminating the minorities problem from these parts of Europe. Many of these minorities, some of which are German, are moreover placed in such insular positions among the foreign people with whom they dwell that they have long since given up the idea of rejoining the motherland. On the other hand, however, they are not ready to renounce their racial heritage.

Now, what can be done about it? There can be no thought of annihilating these minorities or dispersing them. In the face of such ideas there looms, as a reminder, the bloody spectre left by the Greeks and the Turks in Macedonia and Asia Minor. Is it desirable, then, for these minorities to be assimilated by the majority? So believe those who never probed the depths of this problem. Even M. Briand, at the

meeting at Madrid, touched upon this possibility once again. It is an idea which can never be translated into reality. These minorities are proud of their culture which, spiritually and morally, is insolubly related to the heritage of their language and their customs. To renounce these assets would mean to them nothing short of mental suicide. There is no civilized remedy available to foster their assimilation with the majority-people.

It appears that today there prevails something even more important in the spirit of our century, which respects and protects the freedom of the individual. Undoubtedly, this idea has made progress. It was only in the seventeenth century that the old principle was discarded: *"cuius regio, eius religio."** Should it not be possible, in the twentieth century, to grasp the utter injustice of the idea that it remains with those who rule the land to decide upon the racial characteristics of the individual? In our time, the idea of depriving a minority of its racial characteristics should be just as revolting as an attempt to interfere with the religion of an individual.

Here a new thought fights for recognition: the thought that political allegiance and inherited racial characteristics are two conceptions of equal value which may exist side by side. It is altogether possible to be a good citi-

*Whosoever rules the country, chooses the religion.

zen of a country without assimilating the racial characteristics of the majority. Take Switzerland, for example, with her history of many centuries, or Canada, which has applied this principle for a hundred and fifty years. It was the Canadian delegate to the League of Nations, Mr. Dandurand, who assisted the German Foreign Minister in his fight for the right of the minorities. In Europe, Esthonia and Latvia subscribed to this idea by granting their minorities cultural autonomy. As a matter of fact, an entirely new terminology has been evolved to the end that the Swedes in Finland, resolved to be good Finlanders, refuse to be Finns. Those of German descent in Esthonia and Latvia refer to themselves as Estlanders and Lettlanders respectively, and not as Esthonians and Latvians. One solution of the problem obviously lies in the differentiation between racial descent and political allegiance. The German Republic assumes toward this question a position more liberal and more friendly than the diplomacy of pre-Armistice Germany. The Germans of Transylvania still remember the phrase coined by the last German Emperor when conversing with Magyar aristocrats in Budapest: "The Germans on the other bank of the Leitha I gladly leave to you!"

Even during the heydays of Imperial Germany, those of German descent, dwelling out-

side the boundaries of the *Reich,* remained, so far as official German interest in their fate was concerned, primarily subjects of alien rulers. These were frequently good friends of the Kaiser, and it was considered disloyal to show any interest in the fate of the German minorities under their sway. How different today! Now we greet as German brethren all whose language, customs and culture are German, whether they dwell inside or outside the boundaries of the *Reich.* Annual meetings of "foreign country Germans"—*Auslandsdeutschen*—prove to us that the interest of the German people in general, and those who represent the *Reich* in foreign countries, is more alive today for the fate of these Germans and more in evidence than it ever was before the War.

Germany, as a matter of course, will have to extend the same privileges to minorities settled within her boundaries as she expects for her own children living under alien rule. As an illustration, minorities in the *Reich* do not suffer in the least for the sake of their racial characteristics. Under the laws, they enjoy the same status that we are endeavoring to obtain for the millions of our brethren living under alien rule. Some fossilized bureaucrats, still trying to stick to an obsolete Germanization policy of imperial Germany, will certainly not be permitted to interfere with Germany's

great mission in the interest of all European minorities.

There are still some powerful countries which resist any intimation regarding the recognition of racial rights, and those dictatorships that outrage their own peoples prove themselves even more brutal in their treatment of their minorities than do democratic governments. To support this statement by evidence, it is necessary only to mention South Tyrol and Jugo-Slavia. Hope for an amelioration of these conditions rests primarily with the League of Nations.

German foreign policy, after bringing other, still more urgent questions nearer to solution, tackled the question of minorities, fully and for the first time, at Lugano. An attack by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs was countered by Dr. Stresemann, who resolutely and cleverly discussed the minority problem, in this way forcing it upon the attention of the League.

Chief among the reasons why the League of Nations should interest itself in the minority problem is that of peace. It is a fallacy to insist that minorities always show war-like proclivities. Settled, for the most part, along the frontiers of their respective countries, they are the first to suffer the ravages of war. But whenever these minorities are outraged, when

they are deprived of their racial inheritance, when their very life and their property are endangered, a tidal wave of hatred rises, rushing over to the homeland to inundate all peaceful thought. If the League, in accordance with clause XIX of its Covenant, is charged with the abrogation of treaties rendered inapplicable and dangerous to peace, it will not be in a position to ignore outrages continually committed against minorities. This duty of the League refers to all minorities, including those of South Tyrol, because, in view of Article XIX, subjugation of the kind prevalent there is inimical to peace. Besides, under the different treaties of peace, the League played a big part in guaranteeing to minorities the preservation of their racial rights.

What, then, has the League of Nations done, so far, to meet these obligations? They have been discharged in a rather desultory manner. To be sure, as far back as 1920, the League, in a widely published general *vœu,* admitted its obligation to protect the minorities. Nevertheless, neither juridical procedure nor tangible rights were developed sufficiently during the first nine years of the League's existence. Only when a minority complained would the League take action. Many an outrage is committed against the minority which never comes to the attention of the League, for the simple rea-

son that there is nobody courageous enough to raise a hue and cry. It is also a fact that the more brutal a government, the fewer and more carefully guarded the complaints. In such few cases where complaints actually were submitted, they usually were referred to a commission of three. No definite procedure was followed in the investigation: there was no provision for the minority to insist upon a hearing; there was no airing of the complaints in the open and—this seems to be weightier than anything else—no obligation to inform the assembly of the League regarding the results of the investigation. In this way, a growing dissatisfaction among the minorities, amounting to desperation, was engendered. Frequently, they did not notice any results at all, except that their respective governments reacted to the complaint by having recourse to still more brutal methods of subjugation. Even for those members of the League who were in sympathy with the minorities, there was no tangible means available to come to their assistance. Often it was not even possible for these powers to obtain authentic information on the investigation.

Meanwhile, things have taken a turn for the better, since the German Foreign Minister, at Geneva in March of last year, and at Madrid in June, energetically set about to improve conditions. Today, it is provided that the League

commission, in its investigation, remain in close contact with the minority. It is also provided that, in important cases, the commission be augmented by two additional members. Finally, it is prescribed that all complaints taken up be brought to the attention of the members of the council, in this way making it possible for every member, interested in the case, to study the problem, and, if he be so inclined, side with the minority in question. Inasmuch as the council reports on its activities to the assembly, the League as a whole, in September of each year, is automatically informed about the stand of all pending investigations, at the same time receiving suggestions and complaints from the floor.

This, after all, represents progress. The feeling of responsibility imposed upon the League in questions of this kind appears considerably strengthened. If Germany in the future decides to champion the rights of the minorities, she certainly will be assuming an ambitious platform that should enable her to fight a good battle.

But will that suffice in the long run? In September, 1929, it proved hardly possible to induce the assembly of the League of Nations to accept resolutions more far-reaching than those passed by the council some months prior. The

objection was raised that time must be marked until it could be ascertained how the resolutions of Madrid would work out and whether they should be changed or augmented. At the September meeting, it proved impossible to bring this question to a definite solution; all that could be achieved was to keep the question alive. For this reason, Stresemann demanded that, beginning with the next annual meeting, this question should be made not only a regular point of discussion on the agenda of the League, but also thoroughly investigated by a special commission. Anybody who knows what great importance is attached, especially by the newly organized countries of the East and the Southeast, to making a good impression upon the League, and how assiduously they try to prevent the League from throwing the light of public discussion upon their barbarian methods, will understand what tangible progress the acceptance of Stresemann's suggestion implies. It is vital to convince the League, by effectively championing the cause of the minorities, that Germany will not rest until the League exerts a permanent control which will prevent any and all Europeans from suffering for the sake of racial rights. It should become the duty of the League to look after the interests of the minorities, protecting and safeguarding them in their racial aspirations, regardless of whether com-

plaints were actually made or if infringements on these rights are only impending. If the League of Nations is really an instrument to further peace, it should appreciate the close connection that exists between the protection of minorities and a general understanding among the nations.

For millions of Germans, the League and the German representation within the League of Nations constitute their only hope that, some day, they may receive just and humane treatment. At this point, the German interest to preserve necessary and valuable members of its own race coincides with Germany's still greater task within the League of Nations: to see that Right goes before Might and that those who are subjugated be rendered assistance. Germany's principal interest in the future, within the League or without, will revolve around the question.

The *Anschluss*

The victors in the World War, by a dictate contrary to all principles of the right of self-determination, decided that, although a union of Austria and Germany cannot be prevented definitely, its consummation be made dependent upon the unanimous assent of the League. Only a people juridically as cunning as the

French and their henchmen find it possible to defend this interdict, in view of the much vaunted right of self-determination. The French argue that by a union of Austria and Germany the peace of Europe would be endangered, the latter constituting a more important issue than the right of self-determination of a small people. Among other arguments, just as fallacious, is the one that France does not aspire to a union with the French-speaking Belgians. Of course, in this case, the fact is entirely disregarded that the Belgians of French tongue never expressed a desire to be united with France.

Interference with the union of Austria and Germany can only be based upon the right of the stronger. Austria, as she struggles along today, is unable to survive. Although the League of Nations improved her finances temporarily, a permanent rehabilitation of her *valuta* seems improbable.

As a way out, the victors in the World War have suggested that a Danube Federation be organized, comprising the successive states of the defunct Dual Monarchy. Apparently, the victors are not aware that this suggestion amounts to an open admission of bankruptcy so far as their own programme for national states is concerned. By organizing a Danube Federa-

tion, they would merely follow in the footsteps of the old Austro-Hungary which certainly proved economically cohesive. Besides, the idea of a Danube Federation seems impossible to realize in view of the disinclination manifested by the two vanquished successive states, Hungary and Austria. It is not saying too much if it be stated that ninety-five per cent of all the inhabitants of Austria are in favor of the *Anschluss*. The open opponents to the *Anschluss* consist merely of a handful of Austrian legitimists and those Austrian bureaucrats who cannot understand that the *Anschluss* will not mean a demotion for Austria's public servants, but may rather usher in promotion for them. These bureaucrats do not recognize that by *Anschluss* to the *Reich*, Austria would not be reduced to a provincial member under the rule of Berlin, but rather become an integral and equal partner within the Empire. Of course, it is impossible to predict when the international reactionary and arbitrary interference against the *Anschluss* will subside. At any rate, Germany's and Austria's efforts in this direction must never be allowed to lag.

Meanwhile, it is important to take preparatory steps in order to standardize as much as possible conditions in Austria and Germany. It should not prove too difficult to establish free trade between the two countries. Some condi-

tions, as they exist today, demonstrate that it is primarily personal avarice that consistently blocks the path to a customs agreement. For example, to protect the interests of German scythe manufacturers, commercial treaties are drawn up in such a way as to prevent a few Styrian competitors from selling their products in the German market, proving how successful such private interests are in safeguarding their own profit in the face of far-reaching national ideas. The demand that at last a German-Austrian treaty be concluded or, better yet, that Germany and Austria organize a customs union, should be supported much more vigorously.

So far as the administration of justice is concerned, both countries are coöperating today to a great extent. It is to be expected that their coöperation, especially in regard to the penal codes of both countries, will soon reach a definite consummation. As long as the politicians are unable to solve the question of the *Anschluss,* the place of the jurists is in the advanced front line. It is the jurist who must prepare everything to such a degree that, when the time for the *Anschluss* is ripe, no time will be lost in preparatory constitutional work; instead, it should be necessary only to promulgate the new laws.

The union of Austria and Germany could

never be interpreted as a manifestation of Imperialism. *It is merely the fulfilment of a democratic demand.* Whenever the *Anschluss* becomes a fact, Germany will not indulge in Imperialistic revelry, but will merely feel gratified at the consummation of a right, long withheld.

Revision of Frontiers

The right of self-determination will also exert decisive influence on the problem of the German frontiers. Not one of these questions could be successfully solved by a new war. To attempt to regulate these matters by dealing directly with the neighboring country would prove difficult and inopportune. In general, the only hope lies in a better understanding among the peoples generally and arbitration by supranational organs as previously mentioned. There is no German today who considers the Eastern boundary problem satisfactory solved. On the other hand, any German who would dare to step out into the open and suggest a definite solution would be acting in an irresponsible manner, to say the least. All that can be done, for the time being, is to settle individual problems through direct negotiations and resolutely insist upon a thorough airing of the entire question before the League of Nations. Only in this way can we hope to assist our brethren

whom the Poles are trying to Polonize. The isolation of East Prussia and the cutting off of the most important and most promising parts of Upper Silesia left bloody wounds on the body of a maimed Germany, which no fair-minded observer can overlook.

Now that, under the Young Plan, Germany is given a freer hand, her foreign policy will have to deal with a number of very urgent tasks. The liberation of the Rhineland is, of course, a foregone conclusion and so is the liberation of the Saar, even though in the latter case a definite date for the evacuation has not yet been decided. The taking from Germany of Eupen-Malmedy* was unmitigated robbery and must be revoked. So far as Alsace-Lorraine is concerned, in view of past experiences, the only feasible plan would be to grant these provinces autonomy. Autonomy should also be given to the Sudetic Germans.** The German-Danish frontier is surely not all that it should be. As far as Italy is concerned, for military and geographical reasons the frontier was advanced to the Brenner Pass. Ethnographically, this boundary belongs much farther to the south. The treatment to which the thoroughly German population of the South Tyrol must submit at

*Two small places on the German-Belgian frontier.

**The Sudetic Germans are settled in the mountainous region between Silesia, Prussia and Czecho-Slovakia.

the hands of a civilized Italian nation surpasses by far anything ever observed among the less developed peoples of the Balkan. The sufferings of South Tyrol will ever remain a sore spot with us Germans.

The War Guilt Question

Then, there is the War Guilt Question. It may surprise many readers that I speak of this problem only now. However, I do not believe that the revision of the War Guilt Question will serve to usher in international understanding. After all, the question of War Guilt does not constitute the basis of the Versailles Treaty, but is employed as a subterfuge only. The actual basis for the Treaty is our defeat. Official discussions, in regard to war guilt, are not likely to yield early and tangible results. The German Republic already, through the Social-Democratic Chancellor of the first Cabinet, has declared emphatically that Germany's guilt in the War cannot be recognized. It may prove necessary, from time to time, to repeat such declarations. On the other hand, interminable reiterations of this kind serve only to diminish their import. An exchange of notes, somewhat along the line of those upon which the German-Nationalists insisted before the conference at Locarno, would prove even

less practical. The only result this exchange of notes yielded was the repeated assertion of our opponents that Germany was guilty of the War. It is by such declarations that the respective points of view, originally held, are intensified without serving any purpose whatsoever.

Every statesman in every country, who makes an official utterance, must bear in mind the millions widowed and orphaned through the War. He cannot, in all sincerity, profess that their husbands and fathers were not killed in the interest of a just cause. In this respect, anti-German propaganda, availing itself of press and film, succeeded in making the deeper impression upon the people, the greater distance they lived away from ourselves. It is a well-known fact that the virus of anti-German propaganda is still accomplishing sinister work in countries overseas. The germs of hatred reaped a much more terrible harvest there than in countries closer to Germany.*

Although the foreigner is inclined to shrink from explanations and information received from official German sources, he is satisfied to absorb such knowledge in the course of private conversations and through public lectures. During the last few years, when airing the War

*See *Spreading Germs of Hate* by George Sylvester Viereck, with a Foreword by Colonel Edward M. House. Pp. 4 ff.

guilt question in the United States, in Canada, in England, and even in France, I gained the impression, time and again, that today the individual is not nearly as convinced of Germany's sole or even principal guilt of the War as some years ago. Propaganda, which aims at burdening our former opponents with the War guilt, is naturally ignored, with firm consistence, but, on the other hand, strictly impersonal arguments are eagerly accepted.

In view of this state of affairs, those motions presented to the *Reichstag* in 1928 by the German nationalists, which provide punishment for people who publicly express their belief in Germany's War guilt, seem—although perhaps honestly meant and resulting from an outraged sense of justice—inimical to the best interests of Germany. If, within our own boundaries, we do not permit a free discussion of the War guilt question, we cannot expect foreign countries to believe that we are ready for honest argumentation and that there is nothing for us to fear in airing the question. In this regard, a plebiscite appears still more dangerous to me.

I believe that the best method of settling the War guilt question is to bring about an amiable agreement among the nations. Once this is accomplished, the nations will begin to wonder how they could drift so far apart as to be plunged into a war.

Whether historians will ever arrive at a unanimous agreement on the War guilt question seems very doubtful to me. After all, War guilt remains a difficult fact to establish in any single case. This holds true in regard to the genesis of the first Punic War and right up to the telegram of Ems, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The policies here outlined make no attempt to be heroic. However, I do not see the possibilities of heroic policies, so why assume the responsibility of talking as if I did?

More than ever, cool deliberation should distinguish the foreign policies of all peoples. It is not only Germany's culture but that of the entire world that is seriously threatened. Today, it is no longer the vertical separation of Europe into different peoples that is fraught with danger, but rather the horizontal division of Europe into classes. Nowhere in this world —least of all in Russia—is it an accomplished fact today that economic conditions, and the distribution of national wealth, guarantee each and every one that existence which should be the natural heritage of all human beings. Never, in this world, was there enough wealth to go around. But the more the wealth of this world depreciates, the more necessary it is to proceed economically in order to avoid embitterment, and the more necessary it becomes for us to prepare ourselves to answer this ever and again

repeated question: if there is not enough gold and goods in this world to go around, why are large amounts of national wealth squandered in unprofitable armaments? Why did we permit tremendous values to be burned up in the Great War? And why do we not take steps to prevent future conflagrations of similar destructiveness?

Only if, in reply to these questions, we can say that our endeavor to bring about an understanding among the nations is thoroughly honest and is making real progress—only then will the impatient and the disgruntled grant us sufficient time to realize economic and social reforms by those methodic and evolutionary means which alone guarantee a happy consummation.

During these last ten years, the sowing was extremely difficult; it will take long for the harvest to ripen. When the time comes, may this harvest be a blessing to our people and to the world at large.

THE END

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